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1Jonathan William Dodds
Human Rights and Extraordinary Rendition: the International Responsibility of European 
States
This paper considers the extent to which European States were involved in the CIA 
extraordinary rendition programme, either passively or actively. It opens with an account of 
the evolution of the programme from the largely lawful practice of rendition, through to 
extraordinary rendition. There is a consideration of a number of reported cases in order to 
place the practice in context, including those of Binyam Mohammed and Abu Omar. 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the evidence presented with regard to European 
States, with attention given to publications from human rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International, information gathered by the Council of Europe, and opinions offered 
by organisations such as the Eminent Jurists Panel and the Venice Commission. The focus 
then shifts to a number of international legal instruments which provide evidence for the 
illegality of extraordinary rendition, including the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on  Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Customary international law is also considered. Chapter 
Four draws the previous two chapters together, beginning with a consideration of the rules 
put forward in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 
regarding how international responsibility will attach to the actions of States. It is argued 
that in most instances, European States have acted in a way which was contrary to their 
obligations.
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5I
Introducing Extraordinary Rendition
The threat of large scale terrorist attacks is a growing concern to all nations. In particular, 
attacks carried out by Islamic fundamentalists and extremists on Western nations have 
increased dramatically in the past decade. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 
New York, the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the July 7th bombings in London are just 
three examples of the level of danger posed by the organised, international terror cell al-
Qaeda. Increasingly intelligence on the activities and plans of this cell is growing in 
importance. Accurate and detailed information helps save lives and protect States from 
attacks. It is essential that intelligence services receive this information promptly so as to 
provide them with the scope to take decisive action. This ‘actionable intelligence’ is by its 
very nature difficult to acquire with time being of the essence similar to so called ‘ticking 
time-bomb scenarios’. In order to obtain this information, the CIA has utilised a process 
known as extraordinary rendition. This programme generally involves capturing and 
transporting terror suspects to third party countries in order to carry out interrogations.
This paper is separated into four main sections and one concluding chapter. Chapter I will 
introduce to concept of extraordinary renditions, analysing the evolution of the largely 
legal concept of ‘rendition to justice’ into the unlawful practice of extraordinary rendition. 
This section will sketch the outline of the paradigmatic extraordinary rendition operation, 
offering a working definition of the process. The extraordinary rendition programme offers 
up a wealth of areas where human rights abuses may be found. However, in order to allow 
for more detailed analysis, this paper will focus on four key areas where European 
involvement may be indentified: unlawful detention, unlawful transfer, the practice of 
overflights and the association with torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment (while it is accepted that renditions generally refer to methods of interstate 
6transfer, extraordinary rendition’s inherent link with torture necessitates analysis of this 
aspect, particularly where European states receive information which is tainted by 
aggressive interrogation techniques). Some examples of extraordinary renditions will be 
offered in this section to demonstrate how the practice is carried out. Chapter II will then 
move on to consider how and when European states may have assisted in carrying out 
extraordinary renditions. There will naturally be a reliance on NGO reports in this section, 
as governments are understandably unwilling to confirm their involvement in the 
programme. It is hoped that this section will provide context for the following discussions. 
The relevant legal regimes are highlighted in Chapter III: the focus is on international 
responsibility of European states for human rights abuses arising from extraordinary 
rendition, and therefore it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a pan-European 
analysis of domestic legal regimes, nor a general assessment of anti-terrorism law, 
including such aspects as surveillance. With the spotlight on human rights issues, three 
main treaties and legal orders are addressed: the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture (CAT). As extraordinary renditions take place in 
the context of a ‘war on terror’, for completeness, there will be a brief consideration of the 
applicability of international humanitarian law, specifically the Geneva Conventions. There 
is also some consideration given to customary international law. Chapter IV seeks to 
demonstrate where European action (or inaction) towards the programme may lead to a 
finding of international responsibility in each of the regimes found in Chapter III. For this 
purpose, there is a consideration of the rules promulgated in the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, as well as a discussion of complicity in 
internationally wrongful acts. This Chapter seeks to bring together the previous two, 
offering conclusions on where European states are likely to have violated their 
7international obligations under a variety a legal regimes. The concluding remarks in Chapter 
V offer an overview of all areas considered in the thesis.
It is necessary to note that ‘extraordinary rendition’ does not exist as a term of art in 
international law. It is therefore essential to specify exactly what is meant when reference 
is made to the term. This discussion will consider the archetypal ‘extraordinary rendition’ 
which will generally involve the following aspects: identification of a potential terrorist
suspect; unlawful detention of the suspect by national security forces and transfer of 
custody to the CIA; the illegal interstate transfer of the detainee to another country; the 
use of secret detention; and the application of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ upon 
the detainee (perhaps the single most important aspect of an extraordinary rendition). 
From rendition to extraordinary rendition
Rendition, as distinct from extraordinary rendition, existed long before the attacks on the 
Twin Towers. Under the Reagan and Clinton presidencies the CIA developed rendition as a 
tool to apprehend terrorists and wanted criminals before transferring them to a different 
country where they would face criminal investigations and prosecutions.1 A number of 
bodies, including international human rights NGOs and even the US Supreme Court2, felt 
that in this form rendition was lawful and within the international obligations of the United
States.3 It was subject to a number of controls and a strict procedure had to be followed 
before its use could be sanctioned.4 There needed to be 
                                                            
1 Sharma, H ‘Willing accomplices: third-party complicity in the policy of "extraordinary renditions" 
under international criminal law’ (2006) Crim Law 5, 5
2 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
jurisdiction of a US court to try a man brought to the US from Mexico by means of abduction rather 
than extradition.
3 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights ‘Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state 
transfers involving Council of Europe member states’ (7 June 2006) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc162006PartII-FINAL.pdf>, 11
4 Weissbrodt, D and Bergquist, A ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis’ (2006) 19 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 123, 124-5
8‘an “outstanding legal process” against the suspect, usually connected to 
terrorist offences in his country of origin; a CIA “dossier”, or profile of the 
suspect, based on prior intelligence and in principle reviewed by lawyers; a 
“country willing to help” in the apprehension of the suspect on its territory; 
and “somewhere to take him after he was arrested.”’5
While the programme initially targeted criminals and terrorists generally, in 1995 the 
‘serious prospect of Osama bin Laden acquiring weapons of mass destruction’ forced the 
CIA to focus its endeavours on al-Qaeda.6 Following the September 11th 2001 attacks, 
rendition underwent another alteration.
President Bush signed a classified directive in 2001 which approved expedited procedures 
and additional flexibility to the CIA and other state operatives in pursuing the aims of the 
rendition programme.7 Rendition to justice was no longer the aim of the process, instead 
the aim was merely to capture and detain the targets before transporting them neither to 
their country of origin, nor to the United States.8 Instead the detainees were allegedly held 
in ‘black sites’ in third party States, intentionally outside of the purview of any justice 
system.9
Given that rendition was now being used to gather intelligence, the focus shifted from 
transferring detainees for the purposes of criminal trials.10 Rendition had been used as an 
investigative tool in the past, but there is no doubt that the ‘war on terror’ significantly 
                                                            
5 Above n3, 10 
6 Ibid, 9 
7 Amnesty International ‘United States of America / Yemen: Secret Detention in CIA "Black Sites"’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/177/2005/en/413e36cb-d493-11dd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/amr511772005en.pdf>; Weissbrodt, D and Bergquist, A ‘Extraordinary Rendition and 
the Torture Convention’ (2005-2006) 46 Va. J. Int'l L. 586, 590
8 ‘Egypt appears to be the most frequently used receiving country, and other participants include 
Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Yemen’ (Weissbrodt, D and Bergquist, A 
‘Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention’ (2005-2006) 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 586, 590)
9 Above n3, 12
10 International Commission of Jurists ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’ (Geneva, 2009) 
<http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf> 80
9enhanced its application.11 Given the intensified pressure the CIA was under to provide 
actionable intelligence, its operatives and its proxies turned to the use of ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’.12 The use of such techniques was what earned rendition the 
moniker ‘extraordinary rendition’: it is claimed that their use pushed the limit of acceptable 
interrogation methods, and it is possible that they crossed the boundary into torture.13
Indeed, there have been reports of a number of detainees being killed, with one CIA agent 
quoted as saying that “[i]f you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. 
If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear 
– never to see them again – you send them to Egypt.”14
There is therefore a clear difference between rendition and extraordinary rendition. 
Rendition was a largely lawful process which aimed to capture wanted criminals and 
terrorists before transferring them to a location where they could be prosecuted for their 
crimes, and serve their sentences. Extraordinary rendition, on the other hand, seeks to hold 
suspected terrorists outside of the justice system in order to obtain intelligence relevant to 
the protection of States.
Europe Lends a Helping Hand?
While the United States was the chief architect of this programme, European States cannot 
be said to be entirely innocent with regards to its use: many suspects have been captured 
in Europe, or with European assistance. Amnesty International has pointed out that 
‘evidence that European States have been implicated in "rendition" has come from many 
                                                            
11 Sadat, L.N. ‘Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law’
(2005-2006) 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 309, 316
12 Above n3, 11
13 Weissbrodt, D and Bergquist, A ‘Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention’ (2005-2006) 
46 Va. J. Int’l L. 586, 593; A detailed analysis on what constitutes torture will be provided in Chapter 
3, for the current purposes, torture should be considered to refer to the definition provided in 
Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture 
14 Above n11, 314 
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sources.’15 One such source is the Eminent Jurists Panel16 which has produced a report 
where it is suggested that several European Union States have been complicit in the 
programme, naming Italy, Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom specifically.17 The Council 
of Europe, led by Senator Dick Marty18, produced two reports highlighting incidents of 
European involvement in the extraordinary rendition programme including operating 
secret places of detention19 and permitting overflights.20 The report goes on to suggest that 
the extraordinary rendition programme operated through an international network which 
resembled ‘a 'spider’s web' spun across the globe’21 which could not have performed 
effectively without ‘the active participation, or at least the collusion of, national 
intelligence services’ in Europe.22
The Programme in Action
There is a wealth of personal testimony from those who have made claims suggesting they 
have been subjected to extraordinary rendition. A number of alleged victims have come 
forward to give their account of exactly what happened to them during the weeks, months 
and in some cases years that they had been detained. Of course, such claims are the 
                                                            
15 Amnesty International ‘"Rendition" and secret detention: A global system of human rights 
violations. Questions and Answers’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/db1dbfd1-d468-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol300032006en.pdf> 
16 The Eminent Jurists Panel, an initiative of the ICJ, is a group of senior judges and lawyers from 
around the world who, in the course of three years, examined the compatibility of laws, policies and 
practices, which are justified expressly or implicitly as necessary to counter terrorism, with 
international human rights law and, where applicable, with international humanitarian law 
<http://ejp.icj.org/sommaire.php3>
17 Above n10, 81
18 Dick Marty has been a member of the Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of Europe since 
2003. He is a member of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and was charged with 
investigating the involvement of European States in the CIA extraordinary rendition programme: 
<http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/AssemblyList/AL_MemberDetails.asp?MemberID=4023>
19 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees 
involving Council of Europe member states: second report’ (11 June 2007) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf>, 2
20 Ibid, 21-2
21 Above n3, 65 
22 Ibid, 50 
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testimony of suspected terrorists, and so questions will always be asked about their 
reliability. However, the purpose of this discussion is not to determine the veracity of such 
assertions. Included below is a selection of four such accounts, each of which contains 
some element which hints at the involvement of European states.
A. Binyam Mohamed
Binyam Mohamed is an Ethiopian citizen who had been a resident in the UK since 1994, 
where he had been trying to claim asylum in an extended, and ultimately unresolved 
process.23 In 2001, he travelled to Afghanistan and spent several months in the country. In 
early 2002, he intended to return to the UK and in order to do so he crossed into Pakistan 
through Karachi Airport: it was here that Pakistani officials detained him in April 2002.24
Although initially held for allegedly travelling with a false passport, he was later 
interrogated by British and American officials who suggested that he could be transferred 
to Jordan because “[w]e can’t do what we want here, the Pakistanis can’t do exactly what 
we want them to do…”25 After three months in Pakistani custody, he was handed over to 
the US who transferred him to Morocco on a CIA registered plane.26 His detention in 
Morocco lasted for 18 months and Mr Mohamed alleges that he was subjected to torture 
during his time there which he suggests took part in phases including ‘an initial ‘softening 
up’; a routine ‘circle of torture’; and eventually a ‘heavy’ abuse involving the infliction of 
physical injury.’27 This included being suspended from the ceiling, repeated beatings and 
having his penis cut with a razor.28
                                                            
23 Above n3, 44 
24 Amnesty International ‘UK: Government must provide information about rendition, disappearance 
and torture’ <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/uk-government-must-provide-
information-about-rendition-disappearance-and>
25 Above n3, 45 
26 Above n24; Above n3, 45: Official flight records obtained by this inquiry show that the known 
rendition plane, N379P, took off from Islamabad on 21 July 2002 and flew to Rabat, Morocco.
27 Above n3, 46 
28 Ibid
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Mr Mohamed was held in Morocco for approximately two years before being transferred 
to the ‘dark prison’29 in Kabul, Afghanistan in January 2004. He alleges that he was tortured 
again in Afghanistan, before being transferred to Guantanamo in September 2004.30 His 
daily routine of interrogations continued throughout his detainment at Guantanamo and as 
an act of protest he took part in a hunger strike. The authorities responded to this by force 
feeding those taking part, with Mr Mohamed being subjected to three force feedings a 
day.31 Mr Mohamed has stated that his interrogators often questioned him on very specific 
aspects of his life, including ‘details of his education, his friendships in London and even his 
kickboxing trainer.’32 After more than six years of detention, during which he never faced a 
court for any charge, he was released back to the UK in February 2009.33 Since his release, 
Mr Mohamed has unsuccessfully petitioned the UK courts in order to seek some 
recompense for the ordeal he claims he suffered.34
B. Khalid el-Masri
Khalid el-Masri is a German national of Lebanese origin. In December 2003, while travelling 
across the Serbian-Macedonian border, he was apprehended by Macedonian officials 
because of supposed passport irregularities.35 After being held at the border for a few 
hours, he was transported to a hotel in the capital, Skopje, where he was detained under 
                                                            
29 For details see <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/12/18/us-operated-secret-dark-prison-
kabul>
30 Above n24 
31 Amnesty International ‘Document - USA: Ill-treatment/ health concern/ legal concern’
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/018/2009/en/122746c3-f76e-11dd-8fd7-
f57af21896e1/amr510182009en.html>
32 Above n3, 46 
33 Amnesty International ‘Binyam Mohamed released from Guantánamo’
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/binyam-mohamed-released-guant-
namo-20090224>
34 Regina (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) [2009] 1 
W.L.R. 2579 Further facts are set out in the case
35 Above n3, 24 
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armed guard for 23 days.36 He claims he was interrogated in English about his links to 
Islamist extremists, links he fervently denied.37 After this time, he was handed over to 
American officials who transported him, blindfolded and shackled, to an airport before 
beating him and dressing him in a jumpsuit.38 At the airport, he alleges that he was drugged 
before being forced to board a plane bound for Afghanistan. The Council of Europe later 
determined that this was the same plane which had only days earlier transported Binyam 
Mohamed from Rabat to Kabul.39
Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, Mr el-Masri was allegedly kicked and beaten before being 
confined to a cell which would be his home for the next four months. Isotope analysis of his 
hair has confirmed the geographical location of his prison, and his lawyers have contended 
that he was being held in the ‘Salt Pit’, an abandoned brick factory in the North of Kabul.40
While in detention in Kabul, Mr el-Masri says he was repeatedly interrogated about his 
links to the 9/11 conspirators Muhammed Atta and Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, and he alleges that 
German officials actively participated in this questioning.41 After four months of this 
detention, Mr el-Masri was transported from the Kabul prison and transferred to an 
“airport somewhere in the Balkans, probably Tirana, Albania.42 He believes he was then 
driven for approximately six hours before being removed from the back of the car and 
instructed to walk without looking back.43 It later emerged that Mr el-Masri’s detention 
was the result of mistaken identity: the officials who had initially detained him believed 
him to be Khalid al-Masri, a member of the “Hamburg cell” and a conspirator in the 9/11 
                                                            
36 Amnesty International ‘Open Secret: Mounting Evidence of Europe’s Complicity in Rendition and 
Secret Detention’ <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/023/2010/en/3a3fdac5-08da-
4dfc-9f94-afa8b83c6848/eur010232010en.pdf> 25
37 Amnesty International ‘Document – USA/Macedonia/Germany: the rendition of Khaled el-Masri
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/133/2006/en/8d67075e-d404-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/amr511332006en.html>
38 Above n3, 25 
39 Ibid, 16 
40 Ibid, 7 
41 Ibid, 24 
42 Ibid, 7 
43 Ibid
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attacks.44 The Council of Europe reports contend that it was known long before his release 
that Mr el-Masri was an innocent man.45
C. Abu Omar
Abu Omar was an asylum seeker who had travelled from Egypt to Milan, Italy. In 2003, 
while walking to his local mosque, he was stopped by a plain clothes carabiniere (Italian 
military police officer) who asked to see his documentation. While searching for his 
identification, he was bundled into a white van by more plain clothes officers, some of 
whom were US officials.46 The van transported him to Aviano airbase where Mr Omar was 
forced to board a Learjet which departed for Ramstein airbase in Germany, the 
headquarters of US Air Forces Europe,47 before being transferred to Cairo, Egypt.48 He was 
detained in Egypt for approximately seven months, first at the Egyptian military intelligence 
headquarters in Cairo and later at Torah prison.49
Mr Omar alleges that during his time in Cairo, he was subjected to brutal treatment 
including electrocution. If his claims are true his treatment almost certainly amounts to
torture.50 His description of his conditions of incarceration paint a graphic picture: his cell 
was underground and temperatures swung wildly from -5°C in winter to 50°C in summer. 
His cell was rat and cockroach infested and he was provided only one blanket on which to 
sleep.51 Since his release, a criminal investigation has been launched in Italy which is 
                                                            
44 Ibid, 32 
45 Ibid, 24
46 Messineo, F ‘"Extraordinary renditions" and state obligations to criminalize and prosecute torture 
in the light of the Abu Omar case in Italy’ (2009) 7 J.I.C.J 1023, 1023-4
47 Amnesty International ‘Document - Europe: Partners in crime: Europe's role in US renditions’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/008/2006/en/e70e45ed-d42a-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur010082006en.html>
48 Ibid
49 Above n46, 1024 
50 Ibid, 1028
51 Amnesty International ‘Document – Italy: the Abu Omar case’
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR30/012/2009/en/90188bdf-a31f-40b6-85e0-
acaad4606277/eur300122009en.html>
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focussing on the involvement of both US and Italian agents in the abduction. Evidence that 
has surfaced includes a computer belonging to Robert Seldon Lady (who at the time was 
the highest ranking CIA agent in Milan) which contained pictures of Mr Omar, a map 
showing the best route to Aviano airbase and further damaging emails implicating up to 25 
CIA operatives.52
D. The Gambia Case
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna are Iraqi and Jordanian nationals respectively and both 
had a legal right of residency in the UK. In November 2002, they intended to travel to 
Gambia in order to help Mr al-Rawi’s brother set up a mobile peanut processing plant.53
Upon their arrival in Banjul Airport on the 8th November, Mr al-Rawi and Mr al-Banna were 
arrested along with two other men by Gambian authorities.54 As with other cases of 
extraordinary rendition, they were initially told that there was a problem with their visa 
applications, but subsequent questions focussed on alleged links to terrorist organisations, 
including specifically their supposed links with Abu Qatada.55 Mr al-Banna and Mr al-Rawi 
were detained in Banjul for some two months where they continued to be questioned by 
US authorities.56 Wahab al-Rawi, the brother of Bisher and one of the other two men
detained at Banjul, suggested that the American agents constantly told the four men that it 
was the British who had ordered the arrest through MI5.57
                                                            
52 Ibid 
53 Above n3, 39 
54 Ibid 
55 Amnesty International ‘Document - Gambia: Incommunicado detention/Fear of ill-
treatment/Health concern’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR27/006/2002/en/3049afd3-d76f-11dd-b024-
21932cd2170d/afr270062002en.html>; Above n2, 40
56 Amnesty International ‘Document - USA: Who are the Guantánamo detainees? Case sheet No.3: 
Detainees from the UK’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/072/2004/en/20917673-d5df-11dd-bb24-
1fb85fe8fa05/amr510722004en.html>
57 Above n3, 40 
16
Mr al-Rawi and Mr al-Banna were transported to Kabul in December 2002. During their two 
month incarceration at the ‘dark prison’ and Bagram air base the two men were allegedly 
subjected to degrading treatment, and their captors made threats against their families in 
London in an attempt to induce testimony against Abu Qatada.58 The two men were then 
taken across the Atlantic to Guantanamo Bay where Mr al-Rawi says several MI5 agents 
participated in his interrogations.59 Despite their status as legal UK residents, the UK 
government refused for some time to make representations to the US for the release of the 
two men, arguing that their obligation to do so only extended to UK nationals.60 They 
remained in Guantánamo for several years until they were eventually released, without 
charge, back to the UK: al-Rawi in April 2007 and el-Banna in December 2007.61
II
The European Experience
Cooperation in Intelligence Gathering
                                                            
58 Ibid, 40
59 Ibid, 41
60 Above n56  
61 Amnesty International ‘Amnesty UK: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/011/2008/en/c4a03540-519a-11dd-ad62-
d31ddb019522/eur450112008eng.html>
17
In the hunt for intelligence in the post 9/11 world, cooperation between the intelligence 
services of nations such as the US and those in Europe has become of paramount 
importance. Lessons were learnt following the Madrid train bombings of March 2004: 
several of the suspects had been watched closely by the French in 2001, another two had 
been identified by the Moroccan police, and retrospective investigation has unearthed
connections in Germany and Iceland.62 Despite the many pieces of information, the lack of 
cooperation meant the puzzle was never put together. Intra-European collaboration has 
increased since then63, and it is of no surprise that ‘transatlantic intelligence relations are 
now closer than ever’64 in order to more effectively generate actionable intelligence.
Inter-service, transatlantic cooperation had existed in the rendition programme long before 
the events of September 2001 and the advent of extraordinary rendition. Using the UK as 
an example, in 1997 the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service were formally 
briefed on the US strategy of ‘rendition to justice’ with the understanding that the process 
involved capturing known terrorists and bringing them to the US in order to face trial.65 UK 
assistance was offered on a case-by-case basis but would not proceed without approval 
from the Foreign Secretary.66 Further, where appropriate, UK airspace and airports would 
be available to the US for transfers and in 1998, there were four requests for such 
clearances: two were granted while the other two were denied.67
Following the acceleration of the rendition programme, and its change in focus to 
intelligence gathering and detention, European States were able to assist in different ways, 
as well as receive different benefits from the process. Providing information which would 
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lead to the capture of terrorist suspects or even capturing the suspects themselves would 
allow EU members access to the CIA and its vast resources of intelligence generated 
through extraordinary rendition. Other European States, such as Poland and Romania, in 
return for substantial American support for their accession to NATO and the EU 
respectively, offered to assist in the detention of those captured. 
While extraordinary rendition has allowed European States to assist in a multitude of ways, 
this paper will focus on the following four paradigmatic aspects of the process: 
 Complicity in torture 
 Allowing the CIA to operate secret detention facilities within European territorial 
boundaries
 Unlawful or Irregular transfers of terrorist suspects
 Allowing CIA planes to ‘overfly’ European airspace, and allowing stopovers for 
refuelling 
It must be borne in mind throughout that the information provided in this Chapter is 
included for the purpose of contextualising the later analysis on the law related to the four 
areas considered. It demonstrates that there is a need to consider the potential application 
of the law to the issue of European assistance in extraordinary rendition. However, for the 
most part these are accusations, not proven facts.
Complicity in Torture
One of the most consistent claims made against extraordinary rendition has been that it 
was primarily used to outsource torture. There have been few, if any, credible allegations 
that European nations were actively participating in the torture of detainees. However, 
under a number of international human rights and humanitarian treaties, it is unlawful to 
even be complicit in torture. A more detailed analysis of complicity will be provided in 
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Chapter IV; for now complicity shall be considered to refer to situations when (a) one State 
asks another to carry out an unlawful action; (b) where a State knowingly takes advantage 
of an unlawful situation or (c) where a State has actively participated in an unlawful 
action.68
There are several ways in which European states could be considered to have been 
complicit in torture. First of which is the provision of information which leads to the 
capture and detention of an individual or is relied upon during interrogation, which would 
fall under the third conception of complicity mentioned above. Citing the UK as an 
example, Amnesty International suggests that there is reliable evidence that government 
officials passed information which led to the arrest and detention of individuals in 
situations where it was known, or where it ought to have been known, that these 
individuals were at risk of torture or ill-treatment.69 There are two distinct instances where 
an accusation such as this could be applied. In the case of Binyam Mohammed there are 
allegations that during his interrogation in Morocco, he was asked questions about his life 
which contained such specific details that the information must have come from the British 
Security Service.70 These allegations have been confirmed to a certain extent: in its 2007 
report on Rendition the Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that ‘[t]here is a 
reasonable probability that intelligence passed to the Americans was used in [Binyam 
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Mohammed’s] subsequent interrogation’71 while the European Parliament Temporary 
Committee on Illegal Detention (TCID) found that questions put to Mr Mohammed during 
his detention in Morocco ‘appear to have been inspired by information supplied by the 
UK.’72 Given the treatment suffered by Mr Mohamed, and the way in which information 
regarding his personal life could have been used, it is possible to allege that the UK had 
been complicit in his ordeal.
The Gambia case exemplifies an instance whereby information passed between intelligence 
services leads to the capture and detention of suspected terrorists. The two men in 
question were the subject of a series of telegrams from the UK Security Service to US 
authorities which painted them in a bad light. Jamil el-Banna was described as being ‘a 
Jordanian Palestinian veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war... [He] is in close contact with 
members of [two North African terrorist groups]’ while Bisher al-Rawi was depicted as ‘an 
Iraqi Islamist extremist... He has previously come to our attention for his financial 
activities…’73 Information has come to light which suggests that the two men only 
maintained the confidence of those they were accused of being in cahoots with because 
they had been ordered to do so by MI5 in order to collect information.74 While it has been 
argued by the UK Security Service that the telegrams were supplied with the caveat of the 
recipients taking no action on the information provided, the TCID had no problem in 
asserting that ‘the abduction of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna was facilitated by partly 
erroneous information supplied by the UK security service.’ The question then becomes to 
what extent were UK officials aware of the potential misuse of the information they 
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provided? If they suspected that the information would indeed have been acted upon, 
there is again the possibility that the UK was complicit in the treatment of the two men.
There is also the possibility that European states have provided questions to be asked by 
foreign interrogators during torture sessions, or indeed have put questions to the 
detainees directly. Germany has been implicated in two such scenarios: the cases of Khaled 
el-Masri and Muhammad Zammar. With regards to el-Masri, Amnesty International has 
reported the allegation that a uniformed German-speaker, who identified himself only as 
‘Sam’, interrogated him during his detention. Following his release, Mr el-Masri picked 
‘Sam’ out of a police line-up: the man he selected was Gerhard Lehmann of the German 
Federal Criminal Police.75 If this accusation is true, there is certainly a case for Germany 
having been complicit in the treatment of Mr el-Masri. With regards to the second case, 
both the UN Joint Study on Secret Detention as well as the TCID raised the issue of German 
involvement in the treatment of Muhammad Zammar.76 The Joint Study report suggests 
that on 20th November 2006, German security agents interrogated Mr Zammar while he 
was held in secret detention in Syria.77 The TCID suggests that the interrogation was 
allowed to proceed after charges were dropped against several Syrian citizens being held in 
Germany.78 Amnesty International has also suggested that the UK has been involved in 
questioning those detained under the extraordinary rendition programme.79 Martin 
Mubanga, a dual British-Zambian citizen, was captured in Zambia before being transported 
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to Guantanamo Bay in 2002.80 The TCID refers to this case specifically, and unequivocally 
suggests that UK agents interrogated him during his detention.81 If this is indeed the case, 
once again a case for complicity in torture could be made out against the UK.
Secret Detention
The CIA has used a system of prisons throughout the world know as ‘black sites’ within 
which they detain those captured through extraordinary rendition.82 Many are located in 
the Middle East in countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, evidence has 
emerged which suggests that as many as three European states have provided sites for 
secret detention. Poland, Romania and Lithuania have been accused by numerous sources 
of running detention centres where prisoners are held and questioned by CIA operatives. 
A. Poland
The alleged detention facility in Poland is located at Stare Kiejkuty, an intelligence training 
base not far from the airport at Szymany.83 These allegations are based on the testimony of 
a Szymany Airport employee who claims to have seen a medical emergency vehicle attend 
a CIA registered plane, thought to be transferring prisoners, before leaving the airport in 
the direction of Stare Kiejkuty.84
Several of the extraordinary rendition detainees, including Abu Zubaydah, Khaled Sheikh 
Mohamed and Adb al-Rahim al-Nashiri are thought to have been held in Poland at various 
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times.85 Khaled Sheikh Mohamed has asserted that he was definitely held in Poland, and 
cites the provision of a water bottle with a Polish label as proof of his incarceration in the 
country.86
Evidence of Poland’s involvement has been examined in a number of publications. The 
Temporary Committee on Illegal Detention has investigated the personal testimony of 
employees at Szymany Airport. This has included references to six civilian registered 
Gulfstream jets landing at the airport between 2002 and 2003 which the employees were 
instructed not to approach; the fact that excessive landing fees were paid in advance; and 
that a number of military vehicles awaited the arrival of these jets.87 However the TCID felt 
that on this evidence alone, it was unable to say definitively whether or not a secret 
detention facility existed in Poland. However, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe headed by Senator Dick Marty believes that it has been factually established that 
Poland had hosted a secret detention facility.88 Sources for PACE suggested that in 2003 
several high value detainees were being transported out of Kabul, Afghanistan which 
coincides with reports that a number of CIA registered planes arrived at Szymany from 
Kabul.89 Senator Marty believes that these flights bore all the hallmarks of a rendition flight, 
and can be considered to have taken place with the purpose of transferring detainees to a 
different detention facility.90 Amnesty International has also highlighted that on a number 
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of occasions, flights into Szymany arrived with passengers on board, but departed with only 
the crew.91
B. Romania
The alleged detention facility in Romania is situated near the capital, Bucharest, at a facility 
codenamed ‘Britelite’.92 It has been suggested that this black site was established following 
the offer of formidable US support for Romania’s accession to NATO.93 CIA sources suggest 
that it was based in a renovated building, on a busy Bucharest street.94 During its existence, 
it is believed that Khaled Sheikh Mohamed was held at this facility having been transferred 
from the detention centre in Poland.95
PACE highlights a landing at Timisoara Airport, Romania of the N313P rendition plane in 
January of 2004. The flight had arrived from Kabul and remained on the ground for only 72 
minutes before leaving for Palma de Mallorca. The PACE report points out that there would 
have been no prisoners aboard the plane when it arrived in Palma de Mallorca as this 
location is a ‘staging point’ used for recuperation for the rendition teams, and 
documentation proves that the crew and passengers of this flight stayed at a hotel on the 
island for two nights. In addition to this fact it must be considered that the plane, a Boeing 
737, had the capacity to fly non-stop from Kabul to Palma de Mallorca, potentially negating 
the possibility that the stop in Romania was for refuelling.96 Given this evidence, it is 
possible that the reason for the landing in Romania was in order to facilitate a detainee 
drop-off. The UN Joint Study into Secret Detention also looked into Romania’s involvement 
in the detention of prisoners, considering the arrival of a rendition plane into the country in 
September 2003: the plane was following a well known rendition circuit involving stops in 
                                                            
91 Above n78, 26-7 
92 Ibid 31
93 Above n88, 44 
94 Above n71, 50 
95 Above n78, 31 
96 Above n89, 16-17 
25
Afghanistan, Morocco and Poland but the report could not conclude whether or not any 
detainees were left to be detained in Romania.97 The TCID suggested that it cannot be 
definitively stated that a secret detention facility existed in Romania, but also points out 
that there has been no conclusive evidence to rebut the allegations.98
C. Lithuania
Claims of a secret detention facility in Lithuania have centred on a horseback riding facility 
near Vilnius: an interior concrete structure was assembled – a ‘building within a building’ –
with space enough to house eight detainees.99 The Lithuanian parliament initiated an 
inquiry into the accusations with three substantial questions to answer: 
1. Were CIA detainees subject to transportation and confinement on the 
territory of the Republic of Lithuania? 2. Did secret CIA detention centres 
operate on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania? 3. Did state institutions 
of the Republic of Lithuania (politicians, officers, civil servants) consider the 
issues relating to the activities of the CIA with respect to the operation of 
detention centres on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, and the 
transportation and confinement of detainees on the territory of the Republic 
of Lithuania?100
The UN Joint Study was provided with the draft findings of the inquiry. The Seimas 
Committee felt that the facility near Vilnius was indeed equipped to hold detainees but 
once again it could not be definitively proven that any detainees were held there.101
None of these states has entertained the possibility that extraordinary rendition detainees 
could have been held within their territory. Indeed, with the exception of Lithuania, none 
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of them has countenanced the possibility that there was even a facility where detainees 
could have been held. 
Unlawful or Irregular Transfer
The practice of extraordinary rendition naturally involves the transfer of a person from the 
country in which they are captured to another country for detention. The Venice 
Commission102 has identified the four instances where a transfer takes place lawfully: 
deportation, extradition, transit and transfer of sentenced persons for the purposes of 
serving their sentence in another country.103 Deportation refers to the expulsion of an 
alien, which is governed by Article 1, Protocol 7 to the ECHR.104 Extradition and Transit are
governed by both interstate agreements, national law and also the European Convention 
on Extradition 1957.105 Transfer may be governed by the Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons 1983.106 The Commission goes on to consider instances where a 
transfer may be unlawful, indentifying two specific instances: where a person is transferred 
from one state to another without his or her consent in a procedure not set out in law 
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(domestic or international)107 and also where state officials from one state participate in a 
transfer of an individual in a process not set out in law, or contrary to domestic law (such as 
arresting and handing over a prisoner, or participating in a kidnap).108
States which have allegedly assisted in deporting individuals from their territory include 
Macedonia and Italy. The extraordinary rendition of Khaled el-Masri from Macedonia was 
carried out with the assistance of the Macedonian security service, the UBK. The PACE 
report makes reference to evidence which suggests that the UBK was to assist in ‘securing 
and detaining Mr El-Masri until he would be handed over to the CIA for transfer.’109 This 
transfer clearly falls within the second type of irregular transfer described by the Venice 
Commission.  Italy’s alleged involvement in the rendition of Abu Omar could also be 
considered sufficient to constitute an unlawful transfer. While walking through Milan one 
morning, he was captured by plain clothed officers before being bundled into the back of a 
white van and transported to Aviano Airbase and handed over to the CIA before ultimately 
finding himself incarcerated in Egypt. Abu Omar has accused the Italian military security 
and intelligence services (SISMI) as well as the carabinieri of being involved in his original 
capture on the streets of Milan. The TCID report accepts this accusation and condemns the 
involvement of SISMI in the abduction.110
Sweden too could be considered to have carried out an unlawful transfer of Ahmed Agiza 
when he was deported to Egypt in 2001. Despite the deportation being ordered in a 
manner consistent with national law, the fact that the Human Rights Committee found it to 
violate the Convention against Torture suggests that the deportation itself was not 
consistent with a procedure set out in law. Further, the Swedish authorities handed Agiza 
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over to the US who executed the transfer111: this again seems to exemplify the second of 
the Venice Commissions paradigms of an unlawful transfer. 
Overflights
A large number of states have been accused of allowing planes suspected of being involved 
in extraordinary renditions to use their airspace, or even to land in their airports in order to 
refuel and allow the crew to recuperate. The TCID reports that at least 1245 flights of 
planes with links to the extraordinary rendition programme have used European 
airspace.112 The most common include those with the tail numbers N313P (the 
‘Guantanamo Express’) and N379P.113 Of course not all of those flights will have been 
carried out with prisoners on board. It is for this reason that Senator Dick Marty is quick to 
play down exaggerated claims of thousands of rendition flights through Europe for fear of 
losing credibility; however if even one of these allegations is proven to be true, that may be 
sufficient to find a number of states responsible for breaches of their international 
obligations.114
Almost all European states have been implicated in one way or another for allowing aircraft 
known to carry out extraordinary rendition operations to enter national airspace or land in 
airports within their territory. With regards to landing at European airports, the PACE 
reports suggest that there are four distinctive categories of airports: stopover points (for 
refuelling) including Prestwick, Shannon, Roma Ciampino and Athens Airports; staging 
points (where operations are launched from) including Frankfurt, Ramstein and Palma de 
Majorca; one-off pick up points (where on one occasion, a detainee was picked up) 
including Stockholm-Bromma, Skopje and Aviano; and finally detainee drop off points (near 
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detention facilities) including Bucharest and Szymany.115 If these allegations are correct, 
that could implicate Ireland, the UK, Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Macedonia, Romania 
and Poland in being complicit in the extraordinary rendition programme.
The TCID believes it to be factually established that a number of extraordinary renditions 
took place using a variety of European countries throughout the process and believes that 
in some of the cases the detainee was aboard a plane while it was grounded in a European 
state: Ahmed Agiza and Sweden (from Stockholm Bromma to Cairo on 18 December 2001 
(departure: 20.48, arrival: 1.30 on 19 December) aboard the plane registered N379P); 
Maher Arar and Italy (from Bangor, Maine (USA) to Roma Ciampino (Italy) on 8 October 
2002 (departure 13h45, arrival 20h22); from Roma Ciampino to Amman on 8 October 2002 
(departure: 20h59, arrival: 23h54) aboard the plane registered N829MG); Abu Omar
through Germany and Ireland (flight from Ramstein to Cairo on 17 February 2003 
(departure: 18h52, arrival: 22h32); from Cairo to Shannon on 18 February 2003 (departure 
00h22, arrival: 05h42); and from Shannon to Washington on 18 February 2003 (departure: 
14h52, arrival: 21h43) aboard the plane registered N85VM); and Khaled el-Masri through 
Macedonia (from Skopje to Baghdad on 24 January 2004 (departure: 01h30, arrival: 05h53) 
aboard the plane registered N313P).116 The TCID report also highlights a number of other 
flights of rendition planes through European airspace without any detainees aboard.117 The 
Joint Committee on Human Rights report suggests that there is a reasonable suspicion that 
UK airspace was used to transport a detainee to a country where they were likely to face 
torture.118 The Intelligence and Security Committee suggests that while up to 400 CIA 
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flights may have used UK airspace, there are only four where the plane subsequently used 
a UK airport and on each occasion, there was no detainee aboard.119
Information regarding the use of European airspace and airports has been gathered and 
released in a number of reports. In terms of discerning the flight plans of aircraft associated 
with CIA front companies linked to extraordinary rendition, the data has primarily been 
sourced by cross referencing Eurocontrol and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) flight 
records120, and also from the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA). Senator Dick 
Marty and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and the TCID focussed on the 
data available from Eurocontrol. The flight logs produced by Eurocontrol can be grouped 
into two distinct categories: Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) data which comprises 
initial flight plans submitted by air operators before a flight takes place and Central Route 
Charges Office (CRCO) data which provides information on flights which have taken 
place.121 Through the analysis of this information, Senator Marty and his team feel they 
have been able to corroborate ten claims of extraordinary rendition involving European 
airspace or airports.122
The second source, PANSA, has been utilised by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 
(HFHR) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI). The two organisations made an 
application under the Polish statute on Access to Public Information which resulted in the 
release of 19 pages of raw flight data.123 As the HFHR and OSJI rightly point out, this release 
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is significant as the information came directly from a Polish state authority and represents 
the first time that there has been public conformation that CIA registered planes linked to 
extraordinary rendition have landed in Poland.124 Specifically, the data demonstrates that 
the known rendition aircraft with the tail numbers N379P and N313P made six flights into 
Szymany Airport: five came in from Kabul with the sixth arriving from Rabat.125 More 
concerning is the revelation that for at least four of these flights, PANSA brought the plane 
into Szymany despite not having a valid flight plan for that airport.126 While this evidence is 
only circumstantial, when considered alongside accusations that Poland hosted a secret 
detention facility, it obtains greater credibility.
Given the evidence gathered surrounding the use of European airspace it is difficult to 
suggest that they were completely in the dark about the practice of overflights. As this is 
the case, questions must be asked as to why no CIA registered flight was ordered to land so 
as to allow a search to take place. This in itself may be sufficient to engage the 
responsibility of European states.
Conclusion
Clearly it is not in the interest of States to admit to the international community that they 
have been involved in the practice of extraordinary rendition. To do so would be to open 
themselves up to international condemnation and engage their responsibility under 
numerous treaties and conventions. It is therefore of no surprise that the allegations 
against various States have been met with either flat out denial (for example Poland or 
Romania) or the acceptance of the most minor aspects of the accusations (the UK and 
Lithuania). Despite this, the evidence against a number of European States cannot simply 
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be brushed aside: circumstantial or not, the testimony and corroborative investigations 
against several States is substantial. 
The regimes governing the potential abuses are varied, ranging from the regional European 
Convention on Human Rights, to international documents such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention against Torture. Once again it 
must be noted that the information in this Chapter is included for illustrative purposes, and 
should not be taken as concrete evidence for European involvement in extraordinary 
rendition. My attention will next turn to the consideration of the regimes which are in play 
when the paradigm case of extraordinary rendition has been alleged, by first introducing 
the documents in question and subsequently considering the potential breaches of the 
international obligations which arise.
III
The Legal Regime
33
There are a number of treaties which come into play when considering the legal obligations 
of European states. Of course within the scope of this discussion perhaps the most 
important of these, given its geographical application, is the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Other relevant, more international documents to be considered include the 
United Nations Convention against Torture and the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights. Each of these instruments contains specific provisions dealing with torture, 
detention and the right to be heard before a competent legal tribunal. Further, given the 
nature of the war on terror, brief consideration will also be given to the Geneva 
Conventions and international humanitarian law. Beyond specific treaties, an analysis of 
Customary International Law and the jus cogens peremptory norms encapsulated by this 
must be made. 
The Continued Applicability of International Human Rights Law
Most proponents of extraordinary rendition point out the sui generis nature of the conflict 
as a means of justifying the departure from the accepted norms of human rights treaties 
and international humanitarian law. The claim relies on the idea that terrorism and 
terrorists represent an exceptional and unique threat which the current body of 
international law was not designed to deal with. Advocates for this position have been at 
pains to justify this argument and in doing so have constructed what many call a ‘legal 
vacuum’. This is a troubling new approach to the dealing with the issue of international 
terrorism. The use of legal subterfuge which is neither plausible nor persuasive represents 
a ‘sortie against the laws of war themselves’.127 Satterthwaite (while discussing transfers 
during the war on terror specifically) provides a general overview of the legal vacuum in the 
following terms
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...since the transfers occur as part of an armed conflict, we must look to 
humanitarian law for any relevant rules concerning transfers. Al Qaeda 
members, however, are unprivileged combatants and thus unprotected by 
rules found in the Geneva Conventions concerning the transfer of prisoners 
of war or other protected persons. Finally, the argument concludes, the 
rules of human rights law do not apply either, since humanitarian law 
operates as lex specialis to oust such rules from application.128
There are three elements to this analysis: (1) that international humanitarian law (IHL) is 
the applicable legal regime to the war on terror; (2) that al-Qaeda operatives do not enjoy 
the protection of IHL; and (3) that IHL was the lex specialis and therefore precluded the 
application of any other body of international law, including international human rights. 
The applicability of IHL to the war on terror generally, as well as specifically to al-Qaeda 
operatives, is dealt with in more detail later in this Chapter. Focus now is on whether 
international human rights law applies to the War on Terror.
The US’s position is that IHL and the existence of an armed conflict precludes the 
application of international human rights law. However, this position is inherently 
misguided, and represents a misinterpretation of the lex specialis rule. Indeed, as 
Christopher Greenwood states, ‘[t]he fact that the events of September 11 may 
demonstrate a need to re-examine some of the assumptions on which the international 
legal system rests does not mean that those events occurred in a legal vacuum.’129 To 
suggest that international human rights law operates solely in times of peace is 
demonstrably incorrect. Numerous authors have argued that human rights law continues 
to apply: de Londras states that ‘[r]egardless of whether a belligerent state accepts or 
denies that international humanitarian law applies, refuses to implement it or refuses to 
effectively implement it, international human rights law remains applicable and binding on 
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the nation state’ before going on to say that ‘[t]he United States' claim that the application 
of international humanitarian law precludes the application of international human rights 
law is uncontrovertibly incorrect.’130 Borelli has stated that ‘the existence of a state of 
armed conflict does not justify the suspension of fundamental human rights guarantees.’131
This position can be inferred from the pronouncements of international oversight bodies. 
Firstly, the Committee against Torture has responded specifically to the US’s position that 
the Convention against Torture was suspended by the War on Terror, asserting that the 
“Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory 
under [States Party’s] jurisdiction.”132 Secondly, the International Court of Justice 
unequivocally stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion133 and again in Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion134 that international human rights treaties apply in times of war. In the second of 
the two cases, the ICJ opined that 
“The protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict... As regards the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible 
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international 
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; 
yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.”135
It is therefore clear that the US has misinterpreted the lex specialis rule: this rule does not 
completely remove the application of international human rights law, rather it delimits the 
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extent to which it may apply, and the way in which it must be interpreted. The rule seeks to 
overcome conflicts between norms where international humanitarian law takes 
precedence. Satterthwaite gives the example of a soldier killing another combatant: ‘[it] 
looks like a human rights violation (the deprivation of life without due process) until the 
international humanitarian law rule is applied (privileged combatants may kill other 
combatants, or civilians taking a direct role in hostilities).’136 Many of the alleged human 
rights violations in the war on terror have corresponding prohibitions in IHL, and it can be 
argued that harmonisation between the two regimes is the preferred approach where such 
a position arises.137
The European Convention on Human Rights
Drafted in 1950, and entering into force in 1953, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) is the preeminent human rights instrument in Europe. It is a requirement of 
accession to the Council of Europe that all members also become signatories to the ECHR, 
and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).138
The ECtHR is able to hear cases which refer to ‘the interpretation and application of the 
Convention and the protocols thereto’139 which includes interstate applications and
individual petitions.140 In order to petition the Court, the applicant must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies and must make the application within six months of the final decision of 
the member state provided it is not manifestly ill-founded or an abuse of the process.141
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The ECHR is an extensive document, covering a variety of human rights, many of which may 
be infringed by the process of extraordinary rendition. However for the present discussion, 
the focus will be on Articles 3 (the prohibition of torture) and 5 (the right to liberty and 
security) as well as a brief consideration of Article 6 (the right to a fair trial). 
A. Article 3
Torture is entirely prohibited under the ECHR. Article 3 articulates this prohibition as 
follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.142
This Article is expressed in absolute terms and is one of only two Articles of the ECHR 
(alongside the Article 2 right to life) for which the Convention allows for absolutely no 
exceptions or derogations whatsoever.143 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
heard a number of cases regarding Article 3, and has not refrained from expressing the 
importance of this Article. Indeed, it has regularly reiterated that Article 3 ‘enshrines one of 
the fundamental values of democratic society’144 and that it ‘makes no provision for 
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 in time of war or other 
national emergency.’145 Specifically referring to terrorism, the Court in Chalal said that it 
was ‘aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting their 
communities from terrorist violence’ yet went on to state that Article 3 may still not be 
derogated from in these circumstances.146 The Court is also cognisant of the various other 
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international obligations of European States, and it is extremely unlikely that Article 3 will 
ever be interpreted in a narrow way.147
Article 3 prohibits three different types of ill-treatment: torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment. These are often considered to be 
hierarchical in nature (or a ‘ladder principle’), with torture as the worst type of treatment, 
and degrading treatment or punishment worthy of the least censure.148 It was said by the 
ECtHR in Aksoy that this was deliberate construction, in order to allow a special stigma to 
attach to any finding of torture.149 There is a threshold requirement, or a minimum level of 
severity, which must be attained before treatment may even be considered to fall within 
the protection of Article 3.150 In Ireland the ECtHR suggested that considerations such as 
‘the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, 
age and health of the victim’ will play a factor in determining whether Article 3 has been 
engaged.151 Where someone has been subjected to the deliberate infliction of physical or 
mental pain, this is likely to amount to at least degrading treatment, unless it was especially 
trivial.152 The Court in Selmouni utilised the UNCAT definition in reaching its decision:
having found that the actions of the police, in the course of their duties, occasioned pain 
and suffering, the Court turned to the ladder approach to see to what extent the actions 
engaged Article 3.153 This approach has been followed in subsequent cases such as Ilhan v 
Turkey and Salman v Turkey.154
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There are some suggestions that the ECtHR does not fully subscribe to the ladder principle 
approach to Article 3. In Raninen v Finland it was said by the Commission that 
consideration must be given to ‘whether or not the treatment in question denotes 
contempt or lack of respect for the personality of the person subjected to it and whether it 
was designed to humiliate or debase him instead of, or in addition to, achieving other aims’
which the court considered in its judgment.155 This approach, as Evans points out, is far 
more subjective than merely questioning the severity of the suffering for the victim.156 It is 
suggestive of a more expansive approach to the determination of whether an applicant has 
been tortured, especially when considering the fact that what the Court considers to 
constitute torture will change over time. 
As previously mentioned, the ECtHR has considered a number of cases which required 
analysis of Article 3 and it is important to examine how the Court has interpreted the facts 
in those cases. A sensible starting point would be Ireland v UK. The case concerned the use 
of the so called ‘Five Techniques’ which the UK security services and the police employed 
against suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland. The techniques consisted of wall standing, 
hooding, subjection to noise, sleep deprivation and food deprivation.157 The Commission 
considered that these techniques amounted to torture, but when the case reached the 
ECtHR it was found that they amounted only to inhuman treatment or punishment:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the 
extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and 
although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the 
particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so 
understood.158
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The Court felt that while the treatment aroused in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority so as to amount to degrading treatment, as well as causing if not actual bodily 
injury at least intense physical and mental suffering amounting to inhuman treatment, the 
severity of the suffering could not be said to have risen to the level of torture.159
A case in which torture was said to have taken place is Aksoy. The applicant complained of 
a variety of mistreatments including having been kept blindfolded during interrogation, to 
having been suspended from his arms (which were tied together behind his back in a 
manner known as ‘Palestinian hanging’), to having been given electric shocks, and to having
been subjected to beatings, slapping and verbal abuse.160 The ECtHR, having only 
considered the Palestinian hanging, felt that this was sufficient to allow for a finding of 
torture.161
The decision in Selmouni was also significant for what it tells us about the approach the 
ECtHR may take in future cases considering Article 3. Much is made of the fact that the 
ECHR is an organic instrument, which develops alongside society’s view on moral values, 
and once again the Court raised this issue. Following Ireland it was thought that the five 
techniques considered by the Court could never be considered to be anything more than 
inhuman treatment in any subsequent cases. However, in Selmouni, the court made it clear 
that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions’ and also that acts classified as inhuman or degrading treatment in the past 
could in subsequent cases be considered torture.162 In support of this analysis, the Court 
suggested that the level of protection afforded to human rights is attaining an increasingly 
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higher standard.163 Cooper correctly points out that while the severity of the treatment 
may not be changing, society has altered its approach to what it considers to be torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the ECtHR must correspondingly alter its 
position as it attempts to keep up with the moral consensus.164
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, Article 3 ECHR has also been interpreted in such a way 
as to prohibit refoulement. Soering and Chalal are authority for the position that where 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person will be ill-treated following a 
deportation, the country seeking removal cannot effect the transfer. This reasoning was 
approved recently by the Court in Saadi165, a case which also held that diplomatic 
assurances from the receiving country providing that the detainee will not be ill-treated 
were not in and of themselves sufficient to discharge the obligations of the removing 
country.166
As can be seen from the preceding analysis, Article 3 is a wide ranging, and effective 
prohibition against torture. The ECtHR seems willing to take a more subjective approach to 
the determination of torture than merely considering the severity of the suffering as early 
case law suggested. The Court has also recognised that the protection of human rights 
requires firm judicial oversight, suggesting a strong defence of the absolute nature of 
Article 3.
B. Article 5
The practice of extraordinary rendition also impinges on the right guaranteed by Article 5 
ECHR:
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Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person...167
This right is qualified with a list of exceptions provided in Article 5(1)(a-f) whereby the State 
is able to infringe the liberty of a person. These exceptions include such things as detention 
after conviction168, detention in order to bring a person before a competent legal tribunal 
on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence169 and also the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country.170
The list of exceptions provided in Article 5(1)(a-f) is exhaustive.171
Article 5(2-4) provide guidance on what must happen when a person has been denied his 
right to liberty. These subsections require that those who are detained must be informed of 
the reasons why172and have the opportunity to challenge the detention.173 Similarly to 
Article 3, this Article has been characterised by the ECtHR as of the utmost importance. The 
Court in Guzzardi v Italy suggests that the protection afforded by Article 5 is ‘of the highest 
importance “in a democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention’ and therefore 
deserving of strict interpretation.174
Any arrest or detention which is not covered by the exceptions listed in Article 5(1)(a-f) 
cannot be considered lawful and would therefore constitute a breach of the ECHR.
Furthermore, the Venice Commission argues that the protection of Article 5 covers arrests 
made by foreign authorities within the territory of a Council of Europe member state175: 
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authority for this position comes from the vestigial European Commission of Human Rights 
which opined that an arrest by ‘the authorities of one State on the territory of another 
State, without the prior consent of the State concerned’ raises questions of the affected 
person’s right to security under Article 5.176
The ECtHR has said that the Article 5 right to liberty contemplates liberty in the classic 
sense: ‘that is to say the physical liberty of the person’.177 The case of Guzzardi v Italy
concerned a member of the Italian Mafia who was the subject of a compulsory residence 
order on the island of Asinara. The court considered it possible that Mr Guzzardi’s 
detention was effected in line with the exception in Article 5(1)(c).178 However, upon 
analysis of this section, the ECtHR felt that its phrasing referred to the prevention of a 
‘concrete and specific offense’, and could not be employed against a group (such as 
Mafiosi, or terrorists) which had a propensity to crime in general.179 Another important 
point highlighted in this case and others is the pronouncement by the ECtHR that the 
exceptions in Article 5(2)(a-f) must be interpreted narrowly.180 That is to say, where the 
exceptions are relied upon, they should be interpreted in the widest terms so as to afford 
the maximum protection to the applicants. Further, in the Guzzardi case, the Court 
highlighted the need to avoid arbitrariness in detention. The court stressed in its judgment 
that it is essential that the conditions for the deprivation of liberty be clearly defined and 
that the law itself foreseeable in its application.181 This question was also addressed in 
Winterwerp v Netherlands a case which considered the detention of a man following the 
decision that he was of unsound mind. The court suggested that the object and purpose of 
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Article 5 was to ensure that ‘no one should be dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary 
fashion.’182 This requirement to avoid arbitrariness is closely linked to the idea of 
lawfulness, and the Court in Winterwerp went as far as to say that no detention that is 
arbitrary can ever be regarded as 'lawful'.183
A v United Kingdom184 also considered the question of intermittent and preventative 
detention. The Court determined that in the absence of a valid derogation, such practices 
are often found to be incompatible with Article 5 ECHR.185 The same case looked at the 
question of the lawfulness of detention regimes especially in terms of derogations from the 
Convention. The United Kingdom had sought to derogate in order to indefinitely detain 
suspected terrorists. The Court accepted that the national authorities are better placed to 
judge whether there is an emergency threatening the life of the nation and therefore a 
wide margin of appreciation should be afforded.186 It was noted that terrorism had been 
considered a threat to the life of the nation in Ireland v UK and also in Aksoy, and it was 
again found to be so in A v UK.187 However, despite this finding, it was concluded that the 
derogation was invalid in that it disproportionately discriminated in an unjustifiable way 
between UK nationals and non-nationals.188 Given the threat of terrorism is generally 
considered to emanate most greatly from overseas, it is difficult to see how a valid 
derogation could be set up, which does not discriminate in the same way. 
C. Article 6
Extraordinary rendition could also be said to impinge on the victim’s rights under Article 6 
ECHR. Generally speaking, Article 6 ECHR offers the following protection:
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In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to 
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law...189
In order to come under the protection of Article 6, the applicant must demonstrate the 
existence of a dispute.190 Further, this dispute must be genuine and of a serious nature.191
In Perez v France the ECtHR posited that ‘the right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place 
in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Art.6(1) 
restrictively.’192 The concept of what may be arguable as a ‘civil right or obligation’ has 
been the subject of a number of decisions of the Court. In Georgiadis v. Greece it was 
opined that the term ‘civil rights and obligations’ is an autonomous concept which may be 
determined irrespective of the State’s domestic law, and the status of the authority which 
decides disputes in a particular area.193 Whether a dispute is ‘civil’ may also be determined 
in terms of the substantive content of the right in question, and the Court may refer to 
both domestic law and the Convention in reaching its conclusion.194 It relates not only to 
the existence of the right, but also the extent it may be enjoyed by the individual.195
However, the right must have a legal basis in domestic law: the Court is not capable of 
creating a new substantive right for the applicant if they cannot point to its existence on 
the statute book.196
This right can be infringed either through the impossibility of bringing a claim, or can be 
considered to be breached because of an unreasonable delay in proceedings. In terms of 
delays, the Court emphasised that reasonableness is to be judged, amongst other 
                                                            
189 Article 6(1) ECHR
190 European Court of Human Rights ‘Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria’ (31/12/2009) available 
at <www.echr.coe.int>
191 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 35 para 81
192 (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 39, 924 para 64
193 (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 606, 619 para 34
194 Konig v Germany (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 170, 194 para 90
195 Benthem v. the Netherlands (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 1, 8 para 32
196 Fayed v. the United Kingdom (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 393  para 65
46
considerations, in terms of what is at stake for the applicant.197 The ECtHR went on to say 
that what is at stake for the applicant should be ‘acute’.198 It is not a stretch to consider 
that a significant delay in a civil claim for compensation following extraordinary rendition 
would affect an acute interest.
D. The Application of the ECHR
Article 1 states that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’.199 In Bankovic v 
Belgium200 the ECtHR decided that ‘the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily 
territorial’ and that ‘Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary 
and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction...’201 States will therefore be in breach of the 
ECHR when they act contrary to its Articles within their own territory. This would suggest, 
however, that the actions of state officials in other territories would not attract the 
attention of the ECHR. So, for example, states could allow their intelligence officers to 
interrogate individuals held in conditions which violate their Convention rights, or who may 
be being subject to treatment contrary to Article 3, provided this took place outside of the 
espace juridique of the ECHR. This potential loophole was closed by the Court in Issa v 
Turkey202 where it was stated that states could be liable for the actions of their officials 
outside of their territory: ‘[a]ccountability in such situations stems from the fact that art 1 
of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate 
on its own territory.’203
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The obligations placed on states by the ECHR can be both substantive and procedural. For 
example, with article 3, states must refrain from behaviour which may constitute a breach 
(the substantive element), and must also investigate reasonable claims of torture or other 
ill treatment (the procedural element).204 Investigations should seek to end the breach, as 
well as identify those responsible.205 The various elements of extraordinary rendition 
discussed in this thesis may each require states to take action to end or prevent a breach of 
the Convention. Credible claims of torture, incommunicado detention or overflights may 
reasonably be investigated and prevented from continuing, as required by the Convention. 
Potentially unlawful transfers may be stopped if individuals have access to their Article 6 
rights. If such breaches are found to have taken place, Article 13 requires that ‘[e]veryone 
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’206
Overall, the ECHR offers significant protection to all those who fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Court. In terms of torture, the absolute prohibition found in Article 3 is rigidly upheld 
by the ECtHR. With the Court willing to consider a subjective approach, as well as its 
willingness to review previous decisions, ensures that what constitutes torture will keep up 
with modern values and morals. Articles 5 and 6 are regularly noted for their importance to 
a democratic society. While there is the possibility of derogation, the court will police these 
carefully to ensure that they truly meet the exigencies of the situation. The overall 
protections they offer also interpreted in a liberal way allowing for the protection to be 
extended as far as possible, while the exceptions are required to be interpreted narrowly to 
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limit their misuse. Having considered the primary regional text, attention will now turn to 
the international documents, beginning first with the United Nations Convention against 
Torture.
The United Nations Convention against Torture
The second international treaty relevant to the practice of extraordinary rendition which 
will be considered is the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT). While the vast 
majority of international treaties have a more general nature and address a variety of 
themes, the CAT deals specifically with the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment, and issues substantially related to these areas. The 
text of the CAT was adopted by the General Assembly during its 39th Session on 10th
December 1984 under resolution 39/46.207 In accordance with Article 27(1) of the CAT, it 
entered into force upon ratification by the 20th state party on 26th June 1987.208 As of 
March 2011, the CAT has 147 parties. While the specific details of a number of articles will 
be considered shortly, it is worth noting the broad aims of the CAT as a whole. Generally 
speaking, the Convention sought to reinforce the existing prohibition on torture through 
the use of preventive and remedial measures.209 Indeed, a Dutch court, in considering the 
CAT, went as far as to say that the Convention simply codified what was already known: 
that the prohibition of torture was absolute and could not be overridden.210 In seeking to 
realise this aim, the CAT contains a number of innovative provisions including the 
requirement of a specific crime of torture within the national law of signatories, the 
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requirement to exert jurisdiction over those suspected of having committed torture, and a 
duty to investigate reasonable claims of torture within its jurisdiction.211
A. The Committee against Torture
The UN, upon the adaptation of the CAT, promulgated a strong defence of its position in 
saying that ‘this valuable instrument [is not merely] a body of principles and pious hopes, 
the implementation and observance of which would not be guaranteed by anything or 
anyone.’212 Under Article 17, the CAT also established a treaty body – the Committee 
against Torture (the Committee) – which possesses a variety of competencies related to 
the CAT.213 The Committee began to function on 1st January 1988 and met for the first time 
in April of the same year. Meetings of the Committee take place in Geneva twice a year in 
April/May and November.214 Its composition is made up of 10 independent experts who are 
required to be of high moral character and have recognised competence in the field of 
human rights.215 Members of the Committee serve in their personal capacity and may seek 
re-election should they be nominated.216
The competencies of the Committee, and the requirements of States Parties to the 
Committee, are laid down in Articles 19-22. Article 19 requires States Parties to submit to 
the Committee a report which highlights the ‘measures they have taken to give effect to 
their undertakings under this Convention...’217 The first of these reports should be 
submitted no later than one year after acceding to the CAT and from then every four 
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years.218 These reports may be commented upon by the Committee and included in the 
annual report submitted to the General Assembly.219 Article 20 permits the Committee to 
make inquiries where it receives reliable information that a State Party is systematically 
practising torture.220 The State Party in question is invited to cooperate in this investigation, 
including allowing Committee members to make a visit to the State Party.221 It is important 
to note, however, that such inquiries are carried out in confidence for the vast majority of 
the proceedings.222 The findings of the inquiry may only become public should the 
Committee choose to include them in its annual report.223 Articles 21 and 22 refer to inter-
state and individual complaints respectively and each require that the State Parties 
recognise the competence of the Committee to consider such complaints.224 The Article 21 
procedure begins initially with one State Party notifying another that it is not acting in 
accordance with the CAT before reverting to the Committee should the reporting State 
Party feel that the situation has not been satisfactorily remedied.225 Article 22 permits 
individuals to complain to the Committee that a State Party has violated the CAT.226 Strict 
rules apply: the communication cannot be anonymous or incompatible with the provisions 
of the Convention, cannot constitute an abuse of the right to submit a communication 
under article 22, and cannot have been examined (under be under examination) by another 
international investigation; furthermore, all domestic remedies must have been 
exhausted.227 The Committee then considers the merits of the communication with the 
decisions being handed to the State Party concerned and the author of the complaint; 
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where the Committee finds that there has been a violation, the State Party has 90 days to 
present to the Committee any measures taken to rectify the position.228
One final area to note is that the Committee is able to issue general comments which 
contain guidance on the interpretation of the provisions of the CAT, or on thematic 
grounds. Although these are not legally binding, they have an important impact in terms of 
norm-setting.229 General comments 1 and 2, regarding non-refoulement and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment respectively, are of particular interest and will be 
considered in more detail below.
B. Article 1
The first substantive provision of the CAT is Article 1, which defines torture in the following 
terms:
‘...any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person ... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity...’230
The same article requires that this infliction of pain must be with the view to one of the 
following: extracting information or a confession, as a punishment, for intimidation or 
coercive purposes or for discriminatory reasons.231 There are therefore three requirements 
for an act to be properly classified as torture under the CAT: (1) that it causes severe pain 
or suffering, (2) it is inflicted for a purpose (i.e. it is intentional), and (3) it was carried out 
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by or with the acquiescence of state officials.232 When considering these requirements, it 
becomes apparent that the definition proffered in Article 1 can be closely assimilated with 
the requirement that torture is carried out as a purposive, official act.
For Article 1 to be engaged very little state action is necessitated as subsection 1 requires 
only that the act is carried out ‘by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of’ a state official.233 In its Second General Comment, the Committee stated 
international responsibility will attach to acts carried out by ‘officials and others, including 
agents, private contractors, and others acting in official capacity or acting on behalf of the 
State, in conjunction with the State, under its direction or control, or otherwise under 
colour of law.’234 While it is clear that positive acts are covered by the definition in Article 1, 
what is less obvious is whether omissions may fall under its purview. Rodley and Pollard 
have argued that intentional omissions, such as intentional failure to provide a prisoner 
with food or water, would be covered by the CAT, provided the other requirements of 
Article 1 are satisfied.235 Indeed, such an interpretation would be in keeping with the 
purpose of the CAT and the Committee has suggested that omissions are indeed covered 
by the CAT.236
C. Criminalisation of Torture
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Article 4 of the CAT requires States Parties to criminalise torture in line with the 
characterisation proffered in Article 1. Unlike Article 3 of the ECHR, this definition does not 
include any reference to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It would 
therefore seem that the criminalisation requirements of Article 4 refer strictly to torture.237
It was initially believed that States Parties, in seeking to criminalise torture, would be able 
to adopt whatever definition they saw fit (provided it generally encompassed the approach 
taken in the CAT) rather than enacting the precise wording found in Article 1.238 However, 
this approach has been discredited to a large extent by the work of the Committee. In a 
number of concluding observations, including those on France239, Sweden240, Italy241 and 
Spain242, the Committee has stated its preference for States Parties to enact a definition of 
torture which is in strict conformity with Article 1. Indeed, the European Parliament, 
through the Temporary Committee on Illegal Detention, has suggested that European 
states should ‘ensure that their definition of torture is in accordance with Article 1 of the 
Convention [against Torture]...’243
While there is only explicit reference to torture in Article 1, the Committee has stated that 
‘[t]he obligation to prevent ill-treatment in practice overlaps with and is largely congruent 
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with the obligation to prevent torture’ as well as the fact that the ‘definitional threshold 
between ill-treatment and torture is often not clear .’244 Therefore, it is the opinion of the 
Committee that any methods to prevent torture, must also be applied so as to prevent ill-
treatment.245
D. Article 2
While Article 1 establishes what constitutes torture for the purposes of the CAT, Article 2 
provides when this prohibition applies, as well as what steps may be taken to prevent 
torture:
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or 
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may 
be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as 
a justification of torture.246
Article 2 paragraph 1 suggests that each State Parties’ obligations extend to ‘any territory 
under its jurisdiction.’ The Committee addressed this wording as part of its Second General 
Comment saying that it covers any territory and facilities, and must be applied to all 
people, without discrimination, who fall under the de facto or de jure control of a State 
Party.247 The Committee further expanded on its interpretation of ‘any territory’ in saying 
that this prohibition applies to areas where States Parties exercise effective control 
(including during military occupation) and would therefore extend to detention centres and 
includes situations where a State Party ‘exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure 
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control over persons in detention.’ 248 This position has been reaffirmed by the Committee 
in its concluding observations on the UK where it stated that ‘this principle includes all 
areas under the de facto effective control of the State party’s authorities.’249
Closely linked to the idea that the protection afforded by the Convention extends to all 
areas, is the concept that is applies at all times: that is to say the CAT is non-derogable. 
Article 2 paragraphs 2 and 3 state explicitly that no grounds may be used to justify the use 
of torture.250 The Second General Comment of the Committee expanded on the wording of 
Article 2(2) by saying that the non-derogability of the CAT specifically extends to the threat 
of terrorist violence.251
The Committee Against Torture has expanded on the obligations of the states parties to the 
Convention in General Comment 2. Article 2 requires that States Parties ‘take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture’.252 The 
criminalisation of torture (as required by Article 4) and punishment of those who engage in 
acts of torture are thus necessary steps in adhering to the requirements of the Convention. 
But Article 2 goes beyond this, and the Committee has stated that where there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that torture or other ill treatment is taking place, States 
have a duty to investigate.253 Where this is not fulfilled ‘officials should be considered as 
authors, complicit or otherwise responsible under the Convention for consenting to or 
acquiescing in such impermissible acts’ since ‘the State’s indifference or inaction provides a 
form of encouragement and/or de facto permission.’254 Where states fail to adhere to their 
obligations, Article 14 requires that any victim ‘obtains redress and has an enforceable right 
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to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as 
possible.’255
E. Article 3
In terms of extraordinary rendition, perhaps the most important provision of the CAT is 
Article 3 which contains the following:
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations 
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.256
This article clearly plays a pre-emptive role in the prevention of torture as it attempts to 
limit an individual’s potential to be exposed to such ill-treatment. In terms of the content of 
Article 3, the term ‘another State’ may be interpreted as either the immediate state to 
which an individual is being expelled, returned or extradited, or to any other state to which 
he may subsequently be sent.257 Regarding the practice of extraordinary rendition, in terms 
of the wording of Article 3 there have been arguments put forward specifically with 
reference to ‘expel, return ("refouler") or extradite’. A 2004 study by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) argued the possibility of disapplying Article 3 to forcible transfers of 
detainees from one country to another in which they have never previously resided as this 
would not strictly constitute expulsion or returning and would not have been carried out in 
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line with any extradition treaty.258 However, such an interpretation (as noted by the author 
of the CRS study) is against the spirit of the CAT: the fact that States Parties are required to 
criminalise torture in their national law, and no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may 
be invoked to justify torture ‘arguably imply that a state party may never exercise or be 
complicit in the use of torture, even when it occurs extraterritorially.’259 Furthermore, in 
looking at the drafting history of the CAT it is apparent that it was intended that Article 3 
would have extraterritorial effect: initially, reference was made only to expulsion and 
extradition, but return (refoulement) was included in order to make the provision more 
complete: the Article now covers all measures by which a person is physically transferred to 
another state.260
Before Article 3 can apply, it is necessary to determine whether there are substantial 
grounds for believing a transferee will be tortured. Different States Parties have entered 
different understandings of when there is a substantial risk of torture. For example, the UK 
has adopted the ‘real risk’ standard, whereas the US has interpreted the requirement of 
the transferee being more likely than not to be tortured.261 These two interpretations are 
quite different and it does not appear as though the Committee has given a definitive
interpretation of this part of Article 3. In its First General Comment, the Committee stated 
that the risk must be assessed on grounds ‘that go beyond mere theory or suspicion’ yet 
this does not require that the risk must be highly probable.262 The UN has also elucidated 
when a State may exhibit a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
                                                            
258 Garcia, M.J. ‘The UN Convention Against Torture: Overview of US Implementation Policy 
Concerning Removal of Aliens March 11, 2004 (Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 
Congress Order Code RL32276), 18
259 Ibid
260 Weissbrodt, D and Bergquist, A ‘Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention’ 46 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 586 (2005-2006), 612; Above n238, p126
261 Intelligence and Security Committee ‘Rendition’ <http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-
reports/special-reports> (July 2007), 9-10
262 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II) (27 
May 2008)UNCAT General Comment 1 , 375
58
human rights. As reported in a UN factsheet, the Committee has stated that such a 
situation exists ‘...when it is apparent that the torture cases reported have not occurred 
fortuitously in a particular place or at a particular time, but are seen to be habitual, 
widespread and deliberate in at least a considerable part of the country in question.’263 This 
situation need not be the direct result of government action, but an inadequate legal 
regime outlawing torture may be taken into consideration.264
As the majority of Article 22 applications to the Committee are related to Article 3, there is
some valuable information relating to its interpretation to be found in the Committee’s 
decisions. Mutombo v Switzerland265 concerned a man who had fled Zaire following his 
desertion from the army and a period of ill-treatment in a Zairian military camp. The 
Committee opined of Article 3 applications, that ‘the aim ... is to establish whether the 
individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the 
country to which he would return.’266 Therefore, it follows that even though there may be a 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a given state, if it would not 
threaten the individual seeking to rely on Article 3, he is prevented from doing so. Similarly, 
if there is no such situation, it is possible that an individual may still be at risk of torture.267
This decision is also grounds for the position that removing an individual to a country which 
is not a State Party to the Convention is an important factor in considering if that individual 
is at risk of torture.268 The Committee also considered Article 3 in the case of Aemei v 
Switzerland269 which involved an Iranian citizen who had become a People’s Mojahedin 
activist and demonstrated against the Iranian government. After Switzerland sought to 
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deport him back to Iran, he claimed he would be tortured and hoped to rely on Article 3 to 
block his deportation. Switzerland questioned some of his testimony for inconsistencies. 
However, the Committee felt that in attempting to guarantee the applicant’s security ‘it is 
not necessary that all the facts invoked by the author should be proved; it is sufficient that 
the Committee should consider them to be sufficiently substantiated and reliable.’270
Further, the Committee suggested that when considering someone’s Article 3 rights, ‘[t]he 
nature of the activities in which the person engaged is not a relevant consideration in the 
taking of a decision...’271 Article 3 therefore represents a very strong protection for 
individuals against deportation with any risk of being subjected to torture.
As Article 3 protects against refoulement, the use of diplomatic assurances is of particular 
concern. In its concluding observations on the UK, the Committee reported its concern at 
the use of such assurances on the grounds that they are not wholly clear on the obligations 
on either state, and therefore could not be assessed for compatibility with Article 3.272 The 
Special Rapporteur on torture273, while not ruling out their use entirely, suggested that 
there are strong indications that they would not be respected.274 The Joint Commission on 
Human Rights agreed with this assessment, adding that they presented a substantial risk of 
the UK being found in breach of its obligations under Article 3.275
F. The CAT Regime
Overall, the Convention against Torture, as a treaty with a narrow, specific aim, represents 
a very strong defence of the prohibition against torture. Its innovative provisions for the 
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incorporation of a specific crime of torture in the legislature of States Parties allows for an 
improved level of protection for citizens. Further, the Committee against Torture is able to 
further the aims of the Convention and has not been shy in doing so, such as in extending 
the non-derogable nature of torture to other forms of ill-treatment. However, its 
applicability is limited in the overall scheme of extraordinary rendition as it offers no 
protection for irregular transfers or indefinite detention. Therefore, attention will now turn 
to a more general international treaty: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; the Covenant) was one of 
the earliest general international treaties concerned with human and civil rights. Upon the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN General Assembly 
requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare draft covenants on the human 
rights enumerated in the UDHR.276 The Commission completed two drafts in 1954 (one of 
which became the ICCPR, the second being the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights) and they were reviewed by the General Assembly in the same year.277
The text of the two Covenants was approved by the General Assembly under Resolution 
2200 of its 21st session in December 1966.278 In accordance with Article 49, the ICCPR 
entered into force on 23rd March 1976 upon the deposit of the 35th instrument of 
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ratification by a State Party, 10 years after the adoption of the text.279 As of March 2011,
there are 167 States Parties to the Covenant.280
The ICCPR broadly consists of five distinct sections with Parts I and II comprising 
overarching or structural provisions, Part III containing the list of substantive rights and 
fundamental freedoms, Part IV is concerned with the establishment of the Human Rights 
Committee, while Parts V and VI provide for the Covenant’s application and ratification 
procedure respectively. Like the ECHR, the ICCPR addresses a variety of themes and issues. 
A more detailed analysis of specific Articles follows below, but generally speaking the ICCPR 
may be seen as covering areas such as the prohibition on torture, the right to liberty and 
security, the right to proper procedure before a court of law, and also expulsion of aliens.
Importantly States Parties, under Article 4, have the power to derogate from certain 
provisions of the Covenant, though this is not a general power; derogations may only be 
applied during a time of declared public emergency, and a number of the Articles of the 
ICCPR are non-derogable.281
A. The Human Rights Committee
As with the CAT, the ICCPR sets up a treaty body which carries out many functions similar 
to that of the Committee against Torture. Article 28 establishes of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) as a panel of 18 members elected from amongst the nationals of State 
Parties to the Covenant.282 The HRC has four major responsibilities derived from the 
ICCPR.283 Under Article 40, the HRC receives reports from States Parties on the measure 
they have taken to implement the Covenant. The first must be made within one year of 
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entry into the Covenant, and then whenever the HRC requests.284 Secondly, the HRC 
enumerates general comments on the ICCPR which serve as a statement of the law as 
interpreted by the Committee.285 Thirdly, in compliance with Article 41, the HRC deals with 
written communications from States Parties which claims that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.286 However, the Committee only has this 
competence where States Parties have recognised it to do so.287
Finally, the HRC, in line with the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, is able to receive 
written communications from individuals who believe that their rights under the Covenant 
have been breached. This Protocol is optional, but once a State Party agrees to it, any 
person subject to its jurisdiction may lodge a complaint with the HRC. This includes not only 
nationals of the State Party, but also people who are directly subject to the authority of a 
State Party (see discussion below).288 Individuals may only complain to the HRC where the 
application would not be an abuse of process289, and may not complain where the issue is 
being decided under another international investigation290, or where they have not 
exhausted all domestic remedies.291 As of March 2011, there are 113 signatories to the First 
Optional Protocol.292
B. The Scope of the ICCPR
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In terms of giving effect to the provisions of the ICCPR, it is understood that States Parties 
must undertake a three-part approach. The three steps are enumerated as follows: (1) the 
state must respect the rights in the ICCPR, that is to say refrain from a particular action 
which could infringe upon the rights (a negative duty); (2) the state must protect the 
enjoyment of the rights by, for example, establishing an effective legislative regime (a 
positive obligation); and (3) the state must fulfil the right by taking the required steps to 
create an environment in which the rights may be fully realised (another positive 
obligation).293
The ICCPR is binding on all branches of government (at whatever level) within a particular 
State Party, including the legislature, the judiciary and the executive.294 The Human Rights 
Committee, in General Comment 31, has highlighted what is to be expected of States 
Parties. Beyond mere legislative or administrative actions, the aims of the ICCPR must be 
furthered through educative and other appropriate measures so as to raise the levels of 
awareness amongst the population at large.295 Further, States Parties are expected to give 
effect to the Covenant rights in their domestic order: while this may not take the shape of 
direct incorporation, it is necessary to remedy any inconsistencies or to fill any gaps.296
Once it is established how States Parties should give effect to the Covenant, it must be 
decided to whom they owe these obligations. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that its 
provisions must be applied to ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction...’297 This could be read as two separate requirements where satisfying one is 
sufficient for protection or it could suggest that anyone claiming the protection of the 
ICCPR would need to be both within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of a State 
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Party. There is some debate as to whether the ICCPR should be applied extraterritorially 
(i.e. to those who fall within only one of the requirements of Article 2(1)). Some, like Dennis 
& Surena, believe that it should not be298, while others such as Rodley argue that given the 
object and purpose of the Covenant, it would be perverse not to apply it in such a way.299
The Human Rights Committee, in considering the Lopez Burgos v Uruguay300 case, stated 
that not applying the ICCPR extraterritorially would frustrate its purpose. The International 
Court of Justice made its position clear in Congo v Uganda, and is also of the opinion that 
“international human rights instruments are applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a state in 
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory,’ particularly in occupied 
territories.”301 Following these decisions, in 2004 the HRC released General Comment 31 
which provides that States Parties ‘must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party’ before adding that ‘[t]his principle also 
applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting 
outside its territory...’302
C. Derogations and Denunciations
Under Article 4, the ICCPR allows States Parties to derogate from its provisions subject to 
certain requirements. There must exist a proclaimed state of emergency which threatens 
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the life of the nation.303 Further, the State Party must notify the Secretary General of the 
UN of the derogations and its reasons for doing so.304 Any measures which a State adopts 
must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.305 This is in effect a 
proportionality test, which implies that derogations will not be permitted where the same 
result could be achieved through means which do not require derogation.306 The HRC has 
stated that such measures must be used only in exceptional circumstances and must also 
be temporary in nature.307 There are also a number of rights which may never be derogated 
from regardless of the existence of a severe public emergency. Article 4(2) provides that 
the ‘rights to life, to freedom from torture, to freedom from enslavement or servitude, to 
protection from imprisonment for debt, to freedom from retroactive penal laws, to 
recognition as a person before the law, and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ 
are absolute and non-derogable.308 Further, according to the UN Joint Study on Secret 
Detention, derogations from Articles which would inhibit the effective functioning of non-
derogable Articles were likewise not subject to limitation.309
It is also worth noting that the ICCPR may not be subject to denunciation or withdrawal.310
The HRC based this reasoning on the fact that the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR belong to 
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the people, and continue to protect them regardless of a change in government, including 
dismemberment of a State Party, as successor states are automatically assumed to accede 
to the Covenant.311
D. Article 7 and Torture
Like the CAT and ECHR, the ICCPR contains a provision which prohibits torture absolutely. 
Article 7 states this prohibition in the following terms:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.312
This prohibition covers both actions which constitute torture, and also those which do not 
reach this threshold and are characterised as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. As such, this provision is wider in its application compared to Article 1 of the 
CAT. This is further exemplified on grounds that in considering complaints, the HRC may 
take into account more issues, such as the right to family and private life, and the right to 
freedom of movement.313
It is important to note that this article is formulated in absolute terms. As with the previous 
treaties, the ICCPR holds the prohibition on torture in the highest regard, classifying it as 
non-derogable regardless of the existence of a state of emergency threatening the life of 
the nation.314 The HRC has elaborated on this provision in General Comment 20 by saying 
that no justification may be offered which draws upon extenuating circumstances, or based 
upon any order from a superior officer or public authority.315 It is evident that the drafters 
                                                            
311 Ibid para 4 
312 Article 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
313 Duffy, A ‘Expulsion to face torture? Non-refoulement in international law’ 20 (2008) I.J.R.L. 373, 
381
314 Article 4(2) ICCPR
315 General Comment 20 – Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment or punishment (Art. 7) para 3 
67
of the ICCPR foresaw absolutely no circumstances during which the protection of Article 7 
could be removed.316
While the protection afforded by Article 7 is broad, it does not contain a definition of 
torture like the CAT, nor does it provide any guidance as to what may be considered to 
constitute the various forms of ill-treatment it covers. This formulation was deliberate317, 
and it allows the HRC to determine complaints presented to it on an evolving basis, rather 
than having to follow a prescriptive approach which may not take into account the 
changing morals of society. The HRC has provided limited guidance on issues it will consider 
when making a determination on whether torture has been committed. Firstly, the 
Committee notes that both acts which cause physical discomfort, and acts which cause 
mental torment, may run afoul of Article 7.318 Considerations of the nature, purpose and 
severity of the treatment applied will affect the Committee’s determinations.319 Further, 
prolonged solitary confinement may also engage Article 7.320 The Human Rights Committee 
has considered a number of cases which concern Article 7. For example, in Pustovalov v. 
Russian Federation321 the author complained of beatings during interrogation which were 
intended to force him to confess his guilt. In the absence of substantive refutation, the 
Committee found a breach of Article 7.322 In C v Australia323 the complainant alleged that 
his lengthy incarceration had led to the development of a psychiatric illness. In the face of 
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overwhelming evidence in his favour, as well as the State Party’s awareness of his 
condition, the HRC again felt that there had been a breach of Article 7.324
While Article 7 does not explicitly mention non-refoulement, this has not prevented the 
HRC from finding it to be within its ambit. In General Comment 20, the Committee stated 
that States Parties must not expose individuals to the risk of treatment prohibited by 
Article 7 when returning them to another country.325 The HRC further elaborated on this 
position in General Comment 31. The Committee suggested that States Parties must not 
extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the 
Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any 
country to which the person may subsequently be removed.326
The HRC does not however definitively determine what constitutes a ‘real risk’, and as with 
the CAT it may be left to States Parties to formulate their own interpretation. However in 
ARJ v Australia327, the Committee argued that to constitute a ‘real risk’ there must be a 
‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’. In the same case, the Committee felt that to 
apply Article 7 in a way which does not protect against refoulement would run counter to 
its object and purpose.328
E. Article 9 and Liberty and Security
The ICCPR also guarantees a right to liberty and security. Article 9 provides the following 
general prohibition:
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Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law.329
Article 9 also requires more of States Parties where an individual under their jurisdiction is 
deprived of their liberty. It is necessary to inform the person, at the time of their arrest, of 
the reasons for his arrest330, anyone who has lost their liberty must be given the 
opportunity to take proceedings before a court and challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention331, and anyone who’s detention is found not to have been lawful must have an 
enforceable right to compensation.332 Taken as a whole, Article 9 offers a very broad 
protection against arbitrary denial of liberty. 
In terms of the coverage of Article 9, in General Comment 8, the HRC stated that paragraph 
1 is applicable to all deprivations of liberty including criminal cases, preventative detention, 
immigration purposes and so on.333 The HRC has specifically commented on preventative 
detention stating that all the elements of Article 9 will apply to such incarceration.334 That is 
to say the detention must not be arbitrary, should be established by law, and all those who 
have their liberty unlawfully curtailed via preventative detention must have the 
opportunity to challenge it before a court of law. In terms of arbitrariness, the HRC has 
considered this issue on a number of occasions. In A v Australia, the Committee stated that 
arbitrariness must not be equated solely with ‘against the law’; additional considerations 
such as ‘inappropriateness and injustice’ may also lead to a finding of arbitrariness.335
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Further, in C v Australia, the Committee held that in order to avoid the accusation of 
arbitrariness ‘detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State party 
can provide appropriate justification’.336 It therefore becomes apparent that to avoid being
considered arbitrary, detention must be a justifiable and appropriate to the facts of any 
particular case. 
In order for a practice to be established by law, connotations of legitimacy and lawfulness 
come into play. Secret detention cannot be said to be a form of detention established by 
law: such detainees are necessarily outside of the reach of the law, and further ‘[e]ven if a 
State authorized in its domestic laws the practice of secret detention, such laws would in 
themselves be in violation of the right to liberty and security and would therefore not 
stand.’337 The HRC has also considered the question of lawfulness in a number of 
communications. In Basilio Laureano Atachahua v Peru the Committee stated that 
detention would be unlawful where those carrying out the arrest do not act ‘on the basis of 
an arrest warrant or on orders of a judge or judicial officer.’338 It has also stated that 
detention will be unlawful where a court is unable to provide legal qualification for the 
detention.339
Alongside questions of lawfulness, the ICCPR provides for any person deprived of their 
liberty to take proceedings before a competent court to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention. The Committee has said, in both A and C v Australia, that the power of the court 
must extend to ordering the release of a person deprived of their liberty where it is found 
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to be unlawful.340 The lack of ambiguity in paragraph 4, that anyone deprived of their 
liberty may challenge the lawfulness of such a decision, demonstrates its importance. 
Indeed, while article 9 is not in its entirety non-derogable, certain aspects may be 
considered as such. Given the link between judicial oversight and the rights highlighted in 
Article 4, the HRC has stated that the provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural 
safeguards ‘could never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the 
protection of non-derogable rights.’341 Therefore, as the UN Joint Study into secret 
detention states, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of detention should not be diminished by a State party’s 
decision to derogate from the Covenant.’342
Linked with the right encapsulated by Article 9 are Articles 14 and 16 which provide that ‘all 
persons shall be equal before the courts...’ and that ‘everyone shall have the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ respectively.343 In their totality, the 
three Articles detailed here can be seen to provide a strong safeguard against arbitrary 
detention and improper processes before a court of law.
The Geneva Conventions
As extraordinary rendition takes place in the context of an ‘international war on terror’, it is 
essential to consider the application of International Humanitarian Law, and specifically the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, to the practice.344 The Geneva Conventions are a detailed 
collection of four treaties which delimit the accepted conduct of parties during armed 
conflict. Each Convention contains specific articles which should be applied in favour of 
those who fall under their purview. Of particular importance to extraordinary rendition are 
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Geneva Conventions III (relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) and IV (relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Several articles are common to all four 
Geneva Conventions. Perhaps of most importance in this discussion is Common Article 3, 
which Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
has stated in its totality aims to prevent abuses arising from warfare.345  
A. The Scope of the Conventions
The Geneva conventions will only apply in the case of armed conflict. This is a threshold 
question and must be answered before the application of the Geneva Conventions can be 
considered. The ICTY considered the question of what constitutes and armed conflict in the 
Tadic case where it stated that 
‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace 
is reached’.346
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court347 also provides guidance on where 
an armed conflict exists: in Article 8(2)(f) it states that armed conflicts ‘take place in the 
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups ’.348 If it is decided that 
there is an armed conflict, attention must turn to Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.
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There are two potential forms of armed conflict which the Geneva Conventions address: 
International Armed Conflict (IAC) and Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).349 A 
situation will fall under Common Article 2, and will therefore be classified as an IAC for 
which the entirety of the Geneva Conventions will apply, at times of ‘declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties...’350 As the ICRC points out, such international armed conflict ‘occurs when one or 
more States have recourse to armed force against another State, regardless of the reasons 
or the intensity of this confrontation.’351 If a conflict cannot be characterised in such a way, 
then recourse must be had to Common Article 3 which applies (and is the only Convention 
Article to apply) to cases of NIACs occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties. The ICRC states that non-international armed conflicts occur when there are 
‘protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the 
forces of one or more armed groups’ and such confrontations ‘must reach a minimum level 
of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of 
organisation.’352 So, for example, the situation in Afghanistan was from October 2001 to 
June 2002 an international armed conflict, and since June 2002 has been classified as a 
non-international armed conflict (the ICRC took a similar approach to the situation in 
Iraq).353 Different regimes would apply to detainees captured at different times during this 
conflict. This is important, as European states may have had access to detainees captured 
in Afghanistan or Iraq, and therefore, it would be expected that such detainees would be 
treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
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A more interesting analysis applies to the war on terror in general, and specifically against 
al-Qaeda. Initially, the Bush Administration argued that this ‘transnational’ war fell 
between the requirements of Common Articles 2 and 3 and therefore international 
humanitarian law could not apply.354 This position was later reformulated: the Geneva 
Conventions did apply in the war on terror, but al-Qaeda operatives could not qualify for 
protection as al-Qaeda was not a state party to the Conventions. However, in the Hamdan
case the US Supreme Court superseded this position stating that the armed conflict 
between the US and al-Qaeda was at least governed by Common Article 3. 355 It is thus 
apparent that Common Article 3 represents the minimum standard which must apply to 
the war on terror.356 However, it may be argued that the war on terror falls under the 
provisions of Common Article 2 and is therefore an IAC. In Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel v Israel357 the Israeli Supreme Court addressed the question of targeted 
killings and terrorists. The Court found that ‘the fact that the terrorist organizations and 
their members do not act in the name of a state does not turn the struggle against them 
into a purely internal state conflict’ before adding that ‘Confronting the dangers of 
terrorism constitutes part of the international law dealing with armed conflicts of 
international character’.358 If this conception of Israel’s struggles with terrorists can be 
applied to the fight against al-Qaeda, the war on terror may take on the form of an IAC.
While it is accepted that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the ‘war on terror’ 
generally, it is worth considering their potential applicability.
B. Common Article 3
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If the conflict is characterised as NIAC, then Common Article 3 will apply. This article sets 
the minimum standard of treatment that must be extended to those taking no active part 
in hostilities, including through reasons of detention.359 The Article requires that all people 
are treated humanely and without discrimination.360 Common Article 3 specifically states 
that they shall be protected from ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’361 as well as ‘outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.’362 It is clear then, that the 
Geneva Conventions prohibit the three types of mistreatment covered by international 
human rights treaties previously discussed – torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, and 
degrading treatment. The Geneva Conventions do not provide a specific definition for any 
of these categories of ill-treatment, preferring instead a general characterisation. This was 
perhaps a deliberate formulation: narrow definitions (naturally) limit the scope of 
application for legal provisions and so the general classifications leave room for flexible 
interpretations.363 Further, what constitutes ill-treatment may change over time, and the 
general definitions allow for changing moral standards.364
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has considered the 
concept of torture as a war crime and promulgated several opinions on the matter. The 
Delalic case is important as it provides a definition for when the ICTY should find there has 
been inhuman treatment or torture: ‘‘an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, 
judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or 
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physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity’’.365 This 
formulation is very similar to the definition of torture provided in the CAT, except there is 
no requirement for the involvement of a public official. Indeed, the ICTY has expressed and 
determined that there is no need for the perpetrator to be a public official in order for a 
finding of torture.366 The purposive requirement (that the treatment must be inflicted 
intentionally, and for a purpose such as the extraction of information) of the CAT has also 
been transferred to IHL, yet it does not have to be the sole, or even main, reason for 
inflicting the pain and suffering.367 Whether or not a particular act constitutes torture or 
inhuman treatment is determined by the intensity of the treatment, with ‘severe’ pain 
required for torture, and ‘serious’ pain for inhuman treatment.368 All the circumstances 
must be considered, including where necessary cultural influences.369 Factors which will 
have an impact on the assessment include the context in which the pain was inflicted, the 
manner and the methods used, and also ‘‘the position of inferiority of the victim’’.370
Ultimately, all instances of ill-treatment, and whether or not they amount to torture or 
something less, must be judged on a case by case basis.371
C. Prisoners of War
If it is decided that Article 2 does in fact cover the conflict with al-Qaeda – that is to say the 
conflict is an IAC – then it must be determined whether or not members of the organisation 
receive the protection of Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
                                                            
365 ICTY, Prosecutor v Delalic and Others, Case No. IT-96-21 (Trial Chamber), 16 November 1998, para 
543
366 Above n363, 525-6 
367 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvocka and Others, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A (Appeals Chamber), 28 February 
2005, para 153
368 Above n363, 527 
369 ‘...in certain circumstances the suffering can be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions and 
it should take into account the specific social, cultural and religious background of the victims when 
assessing the severity of the alleged conduct.’ ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj and Others, Case No. IT-03-
66-T (Trial Chamber), 30 November 2005, para 237
370 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25 (Trial Chamber), 15 March 2002, para 182
371 Above n363, 521; Prosecutor v. Limaj and Others, para 232
77
War.372 Therefore, detainees must qualify as prisoners of war under the definition 
proffered in Article 4. Paragraph 4A sets out who will fall within this category:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members 
of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, incuding 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is 
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.373
It is difficult to see where members of a terrorist organisation such as al-Qaeda will fit into 
the requirements of Article 4.374 However, if those captured were able to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 4, the following aspects of the Third Geneva Convention will apply. 
Article 13 protects POWs from inhumane treatment, including both acts and omissions.375
Article 130 sets out the grave breaches of the Convention and includes torture or inhuman 
treatment, or being wilfully subjecting a detainee to great suffering.376 Such grave breaches 
are classified as war crimes and States Parties to the Conventions must make these actions 
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illegal in their national law.377 While internment of POWs is allowed378, it may only take 
place in premises located on land, with every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness: 
where this is breached, POWs must be moved to a less injurious area.379 Article 48 requires 
POWs to be notified, and be allowed the opportunity to notify next of kin, should their 
location change.380
D. The Civilian Convention
If al-Qaeda operatives do not fall under the protection of the Third Convention, it can be 
argued that they will enjoy the protection of the Fourth Convention: in the Delalic case, the 
ICTY stated that “There is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and … 
if an individual is not entitled to protection of the Third Convention … he or she necessarily 
falls within the ambit of Convention IV.”381 Article 27 of the Fourth Convention provides 
protection from violence or the threat of violence, as well as requiring all civilians to be
treated humanely.382 In a similar vein, civilians may not be subject to ‘physical or moral 
coercion ... in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.’383 The 
prohibition against torture is reiterated further, with Article 32 requiring the High 
Contracting Parties to agree that ‘each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of 
such a character as to cause the physical suffering’ applying not only to torture, but also 
any other ‘measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.’384 Again, 
internment is allowed but only where it is the last resort for and reasons of safety. The 
decision to intern civilians must include the right to appeal, and also to periodic review of 
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the internment.385 Grave breaches of the Civilian Convention include torture or inhuman 
treatment, wilfully causing suffering and wilfully depriving a protected person of the right 
to a fair trial.386
E. Unlawful Combatants and Customary International Humanitarian Law
There are however arguments against the position that an individual is definitely protected 
either by GC III or GC IV: ‘a person who purports to be a civilian, but engages in military 
activities against the enemy can be considered neither civilian nor combatant’387; ‘a person 
is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of a civilian and the helmet of a 
soldier’.388  The result of this is that such persons are designated as unlawful combatants 
and receive protection neither from the Third nor the Fourth Conventions.389 It is not the 
case however that such persons are beyond the scope of international humanitarian law: 
instead they will be protected by customary rules. Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions (which relates to the protection of victims of IACs) states that 
‘In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international 
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience.’390 Further, Article 75 (which applies where an individual does 
not ‘not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this 
Protocol’391) lists a number of acts which are prohibited and will apply at any time and in 
any place whatsoever including ‘violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-
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being of persons, in particular ... torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental’.392
Additionally subsection 3 provides that ‘Any person arrested, detained or interned for 
actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he 
understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken.’393
The Geneva Conventions provide a series of provisions which aim to protect against many 
of the constituents of the archetypal extraordinary rendition. Torture and inhuman 
treatment, prolonged secret detention and access to the courts are all covered in the 
Conventions, with some aspects covered in the grave breaches provisions. Overall, the 
Geneva Conventions should provide a robust protection of the rights extraordinary 
rendition seeks to infringe. 
Customary International Law
While treaties create laws which must be followed by States Parties, there is another 
important source of international law which must be considered. Customary international 
law may bind states in the absence of an express treaty or covenant. There are 
historically394 two main requirements for the formation of new customary international 
laws: the first being consistent state practice and the second being opinio juris sive 
necessitatis (that the states in question were acting in such a way because they believed 
they were under a legal obligation to do so): it was stated in the Continental Shelf case that 
‘it is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for 
primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.’395 Therefore, where ‘enough 
states act in such consistent manner, out of a sense of legal obligation, for a long enough 
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period of time, a new rule of international law is created.’396 There is also a sub-category of 
customary international law known consisting of peremptory norms of international law 
which enjoy a higher status in the international legal hierarchy: they are non-derogable and 
must be adhered to at all times, in all places, and by all states. These intransgressible norms 
have the capacity to render void any national laws which prima facie breach their 
provisions.397
A. State Practice
The International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) has analysed how new norms of 
customary international law develop.398 In terms of state practice, the IRRC suggested that
the requirement of state practice comprises both physical and verbal acts: physical acts 
may refer to the treatment of persons in custody while verbal acts may include the 
opinions of official legal advisors.399 The weight that ought to be attached to these acts is 
debatable. There are some who would say that ‘talk is cheap’ and that in the absence of 
any physical acts no state practice can be demonstrated.400 However, verbal acts are in fact 
the far more common form of state practice, and international tribunals regularly consider 
them when taking decisions.401 While verbal acts constituting state practice may include 
the decisions of national courts, it does not generally include the decisions of international
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courts which are not state organs. However, where an international court declares the 
existence of a norm of customary international law, this may constitute ‘persuasive 
evidence to that effect’.402 Perhaps the most important case for the determination of the 
existence of a new norm of customary international law is the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case.403 In that case, it was declared that state practice must be ‘both extensive and 
virtually uniform’ in order for it to be deemed consistent.404 However, it is not the case that 
the practice must be universal, it can be sufficient that the practice is ‘general’.405 There are 
no time constraints for the formation of state practice, with the ICJ stating that 
“Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of 
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on 
the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it 
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense 
of the provision invoked ...”406
Rather it is necessary that state practice develop, in whatever timeframe, to the point that 
it is sufficiently dense in terms of uniformity, extent and representativeness.407
B. Opinio Juris
The second criterion of opinio juris is a far harder concept to demonstrate. It is a subjective 
assessment which relies upon the analysing the reasons why states have acted in the way 
they have. For both the International Law Association (ILA) and the IRRC the process of 
determining whether or not opinio juris existed proved difficult or even impossible, and 
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largely theoretical.408 This is because where there is sufficiently dense state practice, it is 
perhaps unnecessary to then begin looking for the second requirement: it is highly likely 
that states are acting in such a way because they believe they are obliged to do so.409 The 
IRRC argues that the need for opinio juris is most where states do not act or react: in other 
words omissions.410 The ILA prefers to say that while opinio juris is not necessary all of the 
time, proof of its absence may be sufficient to prevent the formation of new customary 
international law.  
C. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Customary international law is also referred to in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT)411 and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)412. The VCLT 
states that there is nothing in the Convention which prevents states becoming bound by 
provisions of treaties to which they are not parties, as provisions may become part of 
customary international law.413 Further, the VCLT contains the provision that jus cogens
norms will override treaties:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.414
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Similarly, Article 64 states that the emergence of a new jus cogens norm will void and 
terminate any treaty signed before its emergence.415 The Statute of the ICJ states that in 
the determination of any matter brought before it, the Court will apply ‘international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ when making its decisions.416
D. The Rules
There are certain aspects of international law relevant to extraordinary rendition which 
have reached the level of customary international law. The IRRC provides a list of rules 
which it believes have attained the level of customary international law. This list includes 
enforced disappearance (Rule 98) and the arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Rule 99).417
Through analysis of a variety of legal resources including treaty law, legal scholarship and 
general comments amongst other sources, it has been argued that the principle of non-
refoulement has attained the level of customary international law.418 In terms of indefinite, 
secret or incommunicado detention, the UN Joint Study on Secret Detention stated that 
where the detention is coupled with a breach of non-refoulement, it will also constitute a 
breach of customary international law.419 The IRRC also stated that the prohibition on 
torture is another norm of customary international humanitarian law. However, it is almost 
certainly the case that the prohibition on torture has reached the level of jus cogens and 
therefore cannot be derogated from at any time for any reason. This position is ‘clear 
beyond cavil’ and evidence for this can be found in the numerous international human 
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rights and humanitarian law treaties which prohibit torture420, as well as decisions such as 
Pinochet (No. 3).421
IV
Applying the Law to the Facts
Having laid out the alleged facts relating to European States, and having considered which 
legal regimes may apply to these facts, it is now necessary to determine whether the 
circumstances lead to the conclusion that European States bear some responsibility for 
their part in the extraordinary rendition programme. As a useful starting point, the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility will be considered as a tool 
for determining when conduct may be attributed to a particular State. Secondly, attention 
will turn to the concept of complicity and how that affects the assessment of the facts. 
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Finally, the discussion will focus on the areas European States have offered assistance 
(which were identified in Chapter II) namely secret detention, torture, overflights and 
unlawful transfers.
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility422 set out in four 
parts a map for determining when a State should be held responsible under international 
law. They represent a valuable tool which may be applied to the law and facts previously 
laid out and utilised to determine whether or not European states may be responsible for 
their part in the extraordinary rendition programme. Part One details the requirements for 
the international responsibility of a State to arise; Part Two deals with the legal 
consequences of international responsibility; Part Three indentifies which States may 
enforce responsibility; and Part Four contains some general provisions.423 The Articles deal 
with responsibility in its entirety: that is to say responsibility arising out of treaty law as 
well as customary international law, and they cover instances where a duty is owed to a 
single State or a multitude of States.424 The Articles do not purport to elucidate the primary 
obligations owed by States – the rules laid down in treaties or by customary international 
law – but rather provide a framework for determining which State is responsible where 
there has been a prima facie breach of a primary rule.425 In that sense they provide a series 
of secondary obligations which apply immediately by operation of the law of state 
responsibility426
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Article 1 opens with the statement ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails 
the international responsibility of that State.’427 The commentary makes clear that any 
reference to an ‘act’ includes omissions.428 This position reflects international case law 
emanating from both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its successor 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Phosphates in Morocco case the PCIJ stated 
that upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act by one State against another, 
international responsibility is established “immediately as between the two States”.429
Article 1 may also find a basis in the Corfu Channel case which dealt with Albania’s failure 
to warn British ships of the threat of sea mines. The ICJ stated that ‘[t]hese grave omissions 
involve the international responsibility of Albania.’430
Article 2 lays out the parameters of an ‘internationally wrongful act’. Such an act occurs 
when an act or omission of one State is ‘(a) is attributable to the State under international 
law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’431 The PCIJ 
referred to such requirements when it stated that for a State to be internationally 
responsible any acts or omissions must be ‘attributable to the State and described as 
contrary to the treaty right[s] of another State.’432 The crucial requirement of this Article, as 
the commentary makes clear, is that any act or omission in question must be sufficiently 
attributable to the conduct of a State before responsibility can attach to that State.433 The 
Articles do not specify what type of conduct may be considered, or indeed whether 
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attribution is derived from objective or subjective analysis of the conduct; instead this is 
left to the primary rules.434
In order for conduct to be attributed to a State, it must have been carried out by a State 
organ, and that organ may be legislative, executive, judicial or carry out any other function 
of the State.435 The ICJ has categorised this rule as having ‘customary character.’436 Article 7 
of the Draft Articles further clarifies this position. Under this Article, conduct may be 
imputed to that State even though it was carried out ultra vires or even where the act 
contravenes official instructions.437 This rule has its basis in the Caire case by the French-
Mexican Claims Commission where it was found that the actions of two Mexican officers 
would be attributed to the State ‘even if they are deemed to have acted outside their 
competence … and even if their superiors countermanded an order’ because at all times 
they acted under the ‘cover of their status as officers...’438 This rule has also been applied in 
the Velásquez Rodríguez case by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which has 
stated that ‘...under international law a State is responsible for the acts of its agents 
undertaken in their official capacity and for their omissions, even when those agents act 
outside the sphere of their authority or violate internal law.’439
Article 12 deals with the term ‘breach’, and provides an explanation of where a breach 
occurs. According to this Article ‘[t]here is a breach of an international obligation by a State 
when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, 
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regardless of its origin or character.’440 The nexus between Article 12 and the primary rules 
is clear: no infringement will be proven by reference to Article 12 alone as one must always 
look back to the obligation which may potentially have been breached. The commentary 
makes clear that ‘international obligations’ may arise from customary international law, 
through treaties or by a general principle of international law.441
Article 16 is important is allocating responsibility for a State which is not the primary actor 
in a breach, and may be particularly pertinent in terms of extraordinary rendition. It 
provides that 
‘A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful 
if committed by that State.’
Article 16 effectively sets out a definition of complicity which is discussed in greater detail 
below. The commentary offers examples of when Article 16 may apply and includes 
‘...knowingly providing an essential facility [or] facilitating the abduction of persons on 
foreign Soil...’442 While providing for the responsibility of the assisting State, Article 16 does 
not preclude the responsibility of the acting State. Instead, as the commentary makes clear, 
the assisting state will assume liability only so far as its own conduct ‘caused or contributed 
to the internationally wrongful act.’443
Part II of the Draft Articles begins with Article 28 stating that an internationally wrongful act 
entails legal consequences for the responsible State.444 Article 29 makes clear that 
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responsible States are under a duty to continue to perform their obligations.445 Article 30 
requires that the responsible State cease carrying out the unlawful act and make 
assurances as to its non-repetition.446 Cessation is one of the two general consequences of 
an internationally wrongful act.447 The second, reparation, is set out in Article 31. 
Responsible States must make reparation in full for any injury its unlawful conduct has 
caused including both material and moral damage. In the Factory at Chorzów case the PCIJ 
stated that ‘[i]t is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.’448 Further, reparation must 
as far as possible put the injured State back into the same position as it was prior to the 
breach.449 Reparation does not necessarily accrue in favour of the injured States: human 
rights treaties are for the good of individuals and it is individuals who should be the 
ultimate beneficiaries of any reparation.450
Article 34 sets out three ways in which reparation may take place: restitution,
compensation and satisfaction.451 Restitution requires the responsible state to restore the 
injured state to the position it would have been in had the breach not occurred, provided it 
is not materially impossible and does not involve a cost out of proportion to the benefit.452
The Factory at Chorzów case makes clear that where the cost of restoring the undertaking 
is exponentially high, the appropriate response is to pay compensation at the undertaking’s
‘value at the time of the indemnification’.453 Compensation is therefore not intended to be 
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punitive or exemplary.454 Satisfaction becomes possible where restitution and 
compensation are not and may involve ‘an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression 
of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.’ 455
Article 40 addresses the resultant responsibility arising out of a serious breach of a 
peremptory norm of general international law. The Article applies only where the breach is 
serious; this means either gross (referring to the intensity of the violation or its effects) or 
systematic (whereby the violation is carried out in an organised or deliberate way).456 The 
commentary suggests that evidence of a serious breach may come from a clear intention to 
violate a norm, the scope or number of violations and the gravity of the consequences for 
the victims.457 The definition of a peremptory norm of international law is to be taken from 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.458 Article 41(2) prohibits 
States from rendering ‘aid or assistance in maintaining that situation [of a breach of a 
peremptory norm of international law].’459 This is to be read with Article 16, but also goes 
beyond the provisions contained within that Article: it applies to the situation after the fact 
whereby one State helps another State maintain a breach of a peremptory norm.460
In terms of invoking the responsibility of a State, Article 42 makes clear that any injured 
State may do so, provided the obligation breached was owed to that State individually, or 
to a group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole.461
However, under Article 48 any State other than an injured State may invoke the 
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responsibility of another State if the obligation is owed to a group of States including that 
State or if the obligation is owed to the international community as a whole. Such 
obligations are often referred to as ‘obligations erga omnes’ and will usually include human 
rights obligations. In the Barcelona Traction case the ICJ stated that where such universal 
obligations are breached, any State may invoke the responsibility of the breaching State.462
The Concept of Complicity
Of course, while accusations of European involvement in the extraordinary rendition 
programme are rife, there are very few people who suggest that the states involved were 
themselves directly carrying out the prohibited acts. That is not to say that they were 
unaware that certain acts were taking place. Indeed, as Senator Marty makes clear, ‘[i]t is 
inconceivable that certain operations conducted by American services could have taken 
place without the active participation, or at least the collusion, of national intelligence 
services’.463 Therefore, responsibility may still arise from the concept of complicity in an 
internationally outlawed act. 
Complicity is an internationally recognised juridical construct which is based on one state’s 
knowledge of the actions or intended actions of another state.464  It remains to be seen 
whether this knowledge must be actual, constructive or imputed. Even so, given the 
widespread reporting of extraordinary rendition, it seems inconceivable that European 
States would not have some level of knowledge of the programme.465 Terry Davis (former 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe) stated European governments are under an 
obligation to investigate reports of such gross human rights abuses: “Not knowing is not 
                                                            
462 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. case [1970] ICJ Rep. 3
463 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights ‘Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state 
transfers involving Council of Europe member states’ (7 June 2006) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc162006PartII-FINAL.pdf> 50
464 See above in the discussion on the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility 
465 Amnesty International ‘Document – "Rendition" and secret detention: A global system of human 
rights violations. Questions and Answers’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/d3c8c373-d468-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol300032006en.html>
93
good enough regardless of whether ignorance is intentional or accidental.”466 Further, 
where security services share information with, or facilitate the transfer of detainees, to 
other states which are known to have a poor record in terms of human rights, it is ‘difficult 
to resist the argument that States are complicit, wittingly or unwittingly’ in any human 
rights violations which may follow.467
Article 1 ECHR requires states to provide the protection of the ECHR throughout its 
territory.468 The effect of this is to render European States liable for breaches which take 
place on their territory as if they had committed the breach themselves provided they had 
prior knowledge of its occurrence. Similarly, the ICCPR requires that States Parties provide 
protection for ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction...’469 This 
would therefore imply that where a state is involved in a human rights violation by another 
state within its territory or against an individual subject to its jurisdiction, it would be 
difficult to dismiss the charge that it was complicit and therefore responsible for the breach 
under the ICCPR.
The UN Joint Study on Secret Detention has outlined a detailed definition of complicity 
taking place in the context of secret or unlawful detention. A state will be complicit where 
it 
(a) has asked another State to secretly detain a person; (b) knowingly takes  
advantage of the situation of secret detention by sending questions to the 
State detaining the  person, or solicits or receives information from persons 
kept in secret detention; (c) has actively  participated in the arrest and/or 
transfer of a person when it knew, or ought to have known, that the person 
would disappear in a secret detention facility, or otherwise be detained 
outside the legally regulated detention system; (d) holds a person for a short 
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time in secret detention before handing them over to another State where 
that person will be put in secret detention for a longer period; and (e) has 
failed to take measures to identify persons or airplanes that were passing 
through its airports or airspace after information of the CIA programme 
involving secret detention has already been revealed470
Clearly there are numerous ways in which a European State may be responsible through 
complicity. Indeed, the Venice Commission states that in terms of secret detention, the 
complicit state may be active or passive and highlights the ECtHR ruling that “the 
acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private 
individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction 
may engage the State’s responsibility under the Convention.”471 States also must not take 
advantage of a person who is detained incommunicado in terms of forcing confessions or 
extracting testimony against a third person.472
In terms of complicity in acts of torture, it may be determined that States will be 
responsible where one state offers another state information for use during interrogations, 
where a state receives information knowingly derived from torture, or allows an individual 
to be transported to a country where torture is known to be used during interrogations. 
The Convention against Torture, the key international treaty regulating torture, requires 
only a minimum level of state action for its provisions to be engaged. Pain or suffering 
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which may amount to torture need only be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”473
Specifically referring to the receipt of information obtained through torture, the Temporary 
Committee on Illegal Detention (TCID) stated that it was ‘outraged’ by the legal opinion of 
Michael Wood474 who stated that where there is no direct participation in the torture, it is 
not per se unlawful to receive or possess information extracted under torture.475 There is of 
course a middle ground to be struck in terms of the constraints to be placed upon security 
services in regarding the receipt of information. Further, the TCID neglects to include a 
reference to the knowledge surrounding the receipt of such information. 
It is useful here to draw on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR respectively). While these tribunals deal 
with individual responsibility, the concepts could be analogously applied on an
international level. Specifically, the tribunals have looked into the concept of ‘accomplice 
liability’ which applies in international criminal law, and which some have argued could 
apply to States who are complicit in the extraordinary rendition programme.476 The ICTR 
determined that “anyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose, voluntarily aids him 
or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the outcome of the 
offence.”477 The ICTY concluded that the accomplice’s involvement need only have a 
‘substantial effect’ on the commission of the offence; this is satisfied where but for the 
accomplice’s assistance, the criminal act ‘most probably would not have occurred in the 
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same way...’478 The ICTY goes further, in establishing a conception of complicity which 
seems to contain the elements of actus reus and mens rea.479 In the Tadic case, it was 
determined that in order to prove accomplice liability, there must be intent which ‘involves 
awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate’ as 
well as actual participation in the commission of the crime.480 Applying this logic on an 
interstate level, this would seem to imply that States require knowledge of the violation of 
international law, coupled with actions which facilitate this violation.
Awareness of the potential for complicity in extraordinary rendition was demonstrated by 
the UK through the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). In its nineteenth report of 
session, the JCHR stated that cooperation with foreign intelligence services (in terms of 
receiving information, attending interrogations or providing information either for 
facilitating the initial detention or for use in subsequent interrogations) must take place in 
a way which does not lead to accusations of complicity.481 Where procedural safeguards 
which protect against the appearance of ‘active or tacit approval’ of actions which breach a 
number of international human rights treaties are not effected, accusations of complicity 
will become easier to prove.482
Given the numerous ways in which complicity may arise, this represents a serious threat for 
international responsibility for breaches of human rights treaties and covenants by 
European states. 
Applying the Law to the Facts
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Having laid out the alleged facts relating to European States, and having considered which 
legal regimes may apply to these facts, it is now necessary to determine whether the 
circumstances lead to the conclusion that European States bear some responsibility for 
their part in the extraordinary rendition programme. It bears repeating at this stage that 
the accusations levelled at European states are for the most part unsubstantiated. The 
analysis offered in this section seeks to address whether the claims made could lead to a 
finding of international responsibility should they be verified.
A. Secret Detention
The most pointed accusations for responsibility for secret detention are directed at Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania and these states will be considered below. These accusations 
include the establishment of secret facilities for holding detainees captured during the war 
on terror. The evidence for these accusations come from a variety of sources, but includes 
especially eyewitness testimony from state officials, as well as inferences drawn from flight 
records into an out of the aforementioned countries.483  The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
Convention against Torture each address the issues raised by secret detention. 
Responsibility in this area can potentially be as the primary State actor (actually carrying 
out the detention) or as the secondary State actor through complicity (providing the 
conditions for the breach to take place). 
Assuming that the facilities in questions were actually used to carry out detentions, their 
establishment may be attributed to the States themselves. 484 If the national security forces 
in question were themselves detaining individuals, the following provisions will apply. 
Article 5 of the ECHR provides to all the right to liberty and security. Secret dentition sites 
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will violate this Article on account of the arbitrary nature of the detention. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has regularly suggested that where detention is arbitrary in 
nature, it is often the case that a breach of Article 5 ensues.485 Secret detention for the 
purposes of extraordinary rendition can also not be considered to fall within one of the 
exceptions defined in Article 5(1)(a-f), which must be construed narrowly486, and will 
therefore once again constitute a breach of the ECHR.487 Article 5 requires that individuals 
detained by the State must be told promptly of the reasons for their incarceration, as well 
as being given the opportunity to challenge the grounds upon which they have been 
detained.488 It is a necessary element of a secret detention that any challenge is not 
permitted and it follows that it is highly likely that the reasons for detention are never fully 
revealed, thus providing yet another aspect upon which a finding of international 
responsibility may be determined. Secret detention will also violate Article 6 which 
demands that individuals must have access to a fair and public hearing in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations.489 Secret detainees are prevented from 
accessing the court system in order to challenge their treatment in detention, or indeed the 
detention itself. Detainees are often held for years at a time which must certainly 
constitute an unreasonable delay in allowing a claim to be brought. Reasonable delays are 
judged relative to the ‘acuteness’ of what is at stake for the applicant.490 It is not a stretch 
to consider that a significant delay in a civil claim for challenging secret detention would 
affect an acute interest.
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Article 9 of the ICCPR contains a similar provision which states that deprivations of liberty 
must not be arbitrary and must take place through a procedure as established by law.491
Article 9 applies to all forms of deprivation of liberty, and must therefore apply to 
extraordinary rendition (which may be considered to be preventative detention).492
Arbitrariness may be judged as ‘against the law’ but considerations of injustice and 
inappropriateness must also be considered.493 Secret detention is not a process established 
by law, and must be considered inappropriate in the circumstances; other less extreme 
measures ought to be available, including legitimate detention following a full criminal trial. 
The UN Joint Study on Secret Detention argues that even where secret detention is 
permitted by national law it would still not be legitimate as it would contravene 
international law.494 None of those captured via extraordinary rendition and allegedly held 
in Poland, Romania or Lithuania were done so in accordance with an arrest warrant, or at 
the behest of the orders of a properly constituted court. According to the Human Rights 
Committee this makes the detention unlawful for the purposes of the Covenant.495 The 
ICCPR also contains a provision whereby individuals deprived of their liberty must be able 
to challenge the legitimacy of their detention.496 Again, as secret detention does not permit 
this, it must be considered to breach the ICCPR. 
The act of secret or incommunicado detention has also been addressed by the Committee 
Against Torture. The Committee feels that prolonged isolated detention can amount to 
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cruel and inhuman treatment; Satterthwaite suggests that when combined with ‘coercive 
interrogation techniques’ the issue of secret, prolonged detention is more accurately 
characterised as torture.497 In its Conclusions and recommendations relating to the US in 
2006, the Committee stated that secret detention is per se a violation of the Convention.498
In terms of liability through complicity, it is difficult to see how Poland, Romania and 
Lithuania, through the provision of places of detention, could not fall within the 
requirements of Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility. It is hard to resist the 
argument that such facilities would have been set up without any knowledge of their 
purpose. Indeed, the facility in Lithuania was found by a Lithuanian government inquiry 
(the Seimas Committee) to be perfectly equipped to house detainees.499 As the 
Commentary to the ILC’s Articles makes clear, the provision of an essential facility 
engenders State responsibility through complicity and secret detention cannot take place 
without a place to detain prisoners. If the facts as presented are accurate, it seems 
impossible to come to any conclusion other than a finding of State responsibility through 
complicity for the three States considered.
Secret or incommunicado detention is patently unlawful in international law. However, the 
current international legal regime does not attempt to completely remove States’ ability to 
detain individuals. Rather, it seeks to remove arbitrariness from the process, to ensure that 
those detained are done so with good reason, and having been given the opportunity to 
challenge the lawfulness of their detention. De Londras states that freedom from arbitrary 
detention ‘constitutes a ‘moral fence’ protecting us from unjust interference in our 
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liberty’.500 She is cognisant of States’ obligations to protect their citizens from threats, and 
readily accepts that this may be achieved through a system of preventative detention. 
However, she correctly asserts that the extraordinary rendition programme bypasses 
international law: while ‘[t]he notion of non-arbitrary preventative detention may appear 
to be somewhat paradoxical’ the arbitrariness arises where there is no mechanism to 
challenge the process.501 Even if this mechanism rightly takes into account that the threat 
of international terrorism demands a more relaxed approach to detention, that 
extraordinary rendition completely does away with any form of protection seems extreme. 
The Human Rights Committee has had opportunity to assess laws regarding the detention 
of terrorist suspects in Alegre v Peru.502 Despite Peru arguing that the threats justified the 
measures taken, the Committee felt that emergencies cannot allow for a total 
abandonment of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention.503 The ECtHR has also 
had an opportunity to assess this position. In aI-Nashif v  Bulgaria the Court assessed the 
detention of a stateless Palestinian who Bulgaria had subsequently summarily expelled. It 
was held that “everyone  who  is  deprived  of  his liberty is entitled  to  a  review  of the  
lawfulness  of  his  detention by  a  court” and that “[n]ational  authorities  cannot  do  away  
with  effective  control  of lawfulness  of detention  by  the  domestic  courts  whenever  
they choose  to  assert  that  national  security  and  terrorism  are involved  ...”504 Martin 
Scheinin, in his role as Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, feels that the mere administrative 
detention of individuals represents a violation of international law, and calls for States to 
recognise their duty to bring such individuals before a court in order to determine whether 
any criminal charges may be brought against them: ‘arbitrarily detain[ing] terrorist suspects 
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can never be justified as a legitimate intelligence-led preventive approach to counter-
terrorism’505
As stated, no one is suggesting that States should not be able to detain terrorist suspects in 
order to prevent attacks, or to have the opportunity to legitimately interrogate them. This 
process could be given the veneer of credibility if individuals were able to challenge the
grounds upon which they are detained before a court. Habeas corpus petitions represent 
the perfect method whereby preventative detention could remove the charge of 
arbitrariness, by making it more akin to ‘ordinary’ detention.506 Indeed, the UN Special 
Rapporteurs on States of Emergency, Torture and a Right to a Fair Trial each suggest that 
habeas petitions ought to be non-derogable.507 Substantive habeas reviews of detention 
would eliminate to a large degree the threat of arbitrary, secret detention.
B. Unlawful Transfer
The archetypal involvement of a European State in an unlawful or irregular transfer can be 
seen in the cases of Abu Omar and Italy, and Khaled el-Masri and Macedonia. In each, the 
European States involved assisted in the kidnapping of an individual before handing him 
over for transfer to another country. The responsibility of these States may be assessed 
either for their involvement in a transfer which breached the principle of non-refoulement, 
or because the transfer ignored the requirements of allowing a challenge to be made to the 
grounds upon which it occurred. 
As previously discussed, there are only a limited number of legitimate ways in which an 
individual may be transferred across borders.508 The practice of extraordinary rendition 
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cannot be said to be lawful. It is not a form of deportation, extradition, transit or transfer 
for the purposes of serving a sentence.509 The programme is not set out in law, and its 
association with kidnap makes it inherently unlawful. As a general rule, States are not 
absolutely bound by any extradition agreements which they have entered into: ‘whether or 
not a state insists upon or waives compliance with bilateral extradition procedures in force 
between it and another state is a question for those two states alone.’510 However, while 
formal procedures may be ignored, transfers must always respect the fundamental rights 
of the detainee in question.
Perhaps the most egregious breach which arises from transfers and extraordinary rendition 
is through refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement (that a State may not transfer an 
individual to another state where there is a substantial risk that they may be subjected to 
torture) is set out in a number of treaties. While ECHR Article 3 does not specifically 
reference refoulement, the ECtHR has ruled that it is covered by its wording. Soering v 
UK511 and Chahal v UK512 initially laid the groundwork for this position, which was recently 
confirmed in Saadi v Italy.513 The CAT refers to refoulement in Article 3 and absolutely 
prohibits any transfer where non-refoulement may be breached.514 Subsection 2 refers to 
grounds where individuals may be at risk, including the existence in the destination country 
of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.515
Abu Omar was a member of the Islamic political organisation al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which 
was declared illegal by Egypt. That he was transferred to Egypt ignored the fact that the 
Egyptian State is well known for torturing its political prisoners. Therefore, it can 
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reasonably be argued that Mr Omar was at personal risk of being tortured. Personal risk is 
something which the Committee against Torture makes clear is indicative of a breach of the 
principle of non-refoulement.516 Similarly with Mr el-Masri, the Salt Pit prison in 
Afghanistan is another location known where mistreatment of prisoners was rife.  For their 
part in the transfer of these two men, Italy and Macedonia are likely to be internationally 
responsible for a breach of Article 3 of the CAT and Article 3 of the ECHR. State operatives 
from each country participated in the capture of the two men and as such these actions 
must be imputed to the state in question according to Article 4 of the ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility. Given the fact that the transfers may not have occurred at all had it not 
been for the two countries in question, it is difficult to resist the argument that they should 
be found responsible for a breach of Article 3 ECHR.
Article 7 of the ICCPR has also been characterised as bearing on non-refoulement.517 The 
Human Rights Committee stated that where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there is a real risk of irreparable harm upon transfer, that transfer cannot be effected. 
In ARJ v Australia518 the HRC stated that where such harm was a necessary and foreseeable 
consequence of a transfer, then a real risk exists. As with Article 3 of the CAT, such a risk 
must have existed prior to the transfers of Mr Omar and Mr el-Masri. As it did, the two 
states are likely also to be responsible for a breach of Article 7 ICCPR. Further, it has also 
been argued that customary international law also upholds the non-refoulement principle 
due to its association with torture: Duffy argues that with 90% of the world’s sovereign 
States signed up to the Convention against Torture which prohibits refoulement, there is 
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the necessary state practice and opinio juris to suggest that non-refoulement is part of 
customary international law.519
Clearly, the principle of non-refoulement represents a substantial bar to States’ ability to 
transfer individuals out of their territory. European states may argue that transferring an 
individual into the custody of the US does not represent exposing them to the risk of 
torture, as the US has regularly made clear that it does not torture detainees. However, this 
would be out of line with international law. As Satterthwaite makes clear, ‘...a state cannot 
discharge its duty not to expose a detainee to risk by first sending the individual to a safe 
state. The trajectory is irrelevant; what matters is the knowing transfer in the face of a 
risk.’520 Borelli too notes this concern when arguing that a State which transfers an 
individual to the jurisdiction of another, the former is responsible for ‘every foreseeable 
violation of any human right and fundamental freedom’ which the transferee may suffer as 
a consequence of the transfer521, and that the non-refoulement principle bars transfers of 
detainees ‘to countries which are likely, in turn, to surrender them to States where their 
fundamental rights may be breached.’522 Further, it is the mere act of transferring the 
individual which engenders the State’s responsibility; it does not matter whether or not 
they are tortured, or subject to cruel or inhuman treatment, but that there was such a risk 
inherent in the transfer. As the Human Rights Committee stated in Ng v Canada: ‘The 
foreseeability of the consequence would mean that there was a present violation by the 
State party, even though the consequence would not occur until later on.’523
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In order to overcome this issue, several states have argued for a balancing act to be struck. 
There is an interesting nexus between expulsion of terrorist threats and the protection of a 
State’s citizenry. If states are under an obligation to protect their citizens from threats, and 
also under an obligation to prevent people from being exposed to ill treatment through 
expulsion, where should the balance lie? A Working Document from the European 
Commission of the European Communities argued that the ECtHR should seek to strike the 
balance somewhere closer to the protection of a State’s citizens.  However, this raises a 
number of difficult questions, such as those identified by Bruin and Wouters: ‘First, how 
will the European Court of Human Rights deal with the political pressure in adopting a 
‘balancing act’ between the protection needs of the individual and the security interests of 
a State? Second, a more fundamental question is whether or not Article 3 ECHR leaves any 
room for adopting a ‘balancing act’.’524   The determinations of the ECtHR – and the 
Committee against Torture regarding CAT Article 3 – seem to be absolute. Indeed the 
Committee has stated that 
Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the 
State party is under obligation not to return the person concerned to that 
State. The nature of the Activities in which the person is engaged cannot be a 
material consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the 
Convention.525
Thus it would seem apparent that to suggest that a balancing act could be achieved is 
contrary to the obligations States are under through international law.
Another method by which States have sought to overcome the prohibition on refoulement 
is through diplomatic assurances. Essentially, these are agreements which purport to 
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ensure the receiving nation treats the detainees in a way which is consistent with their 
national law and international obligations, and in particular seem to be used in order to 
avoid the obligation on states to prevent refoulement. Some assurances contain visitation 
rights in order for the deporting country to monitor the situation. In its Second Periodic 
Report to the Committee against Torture, the United States suggested that it will avoid 
breaching its international responsibilities through the use of diplomatic assurances:
The United States obtains assurances, as appropriate, from the foreign 
government to which a detainee is transferred that it will not torture the 
individual being transferred. If assurances were not considered sufficient when 
balanced against treatment concerns, the United States would not transfer the 
person to the control of that government unless the concerns were 
satisfactorily resolved.526
The US believes that where these assurances are granted, this removes the risk of torture 
or ill treatment.527 European states, including the UK and Italy, have also entered into such 
agreements with countries such as Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria.528
In the abstract, these assurances may seem entirely reasonable: there is a demonstration 
by the sending state that they are concerned enough about the potential mistreatment of 
an individual to seek assurances that they will not be subject to mistreatment. Indeed, in 
Europe assurances are often sought in order to ensure that an individual extradited to, for 
example, the US will not be subject to the death penalty.529 Further, international law does 
not explicitly prohibit their use.530 For example, the CAT allows for ‘relevant considerations’ 
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to be taken into account when a decision to expel an individual is taken, and it could be 
that diplomatic assurances have a role to play in this.531
De Londras has identified three requirements which must be present in order for 
diplomatic assurances to offer adequate protection: ‘(i) the promise itself must be 
adequate; (ii) the matter in relation to which the promise is made must be within the 
control of the promisor; and (iii) the promisor must enjoy credibility in relation to the 
matter at hand and in relation to the promisee state.’532 These requirements may be 
demonstrated in the relevant case law. The first requirement can be seen both in Soering v 
UK533 (an ECtHR decision) and Aylor-Davis v France534 (a Committee against Torture 
decision). In the former, a promise was made that should Soering be convicted of murder in 
Virginia, the UK would be able to make representations that he should not be executed. In 
that case, the assurance was seen as being inadequate, as Soering may still have been 
subject to death row phenomenon which was considered a form of cruel treatment. In the 
latter case however, the promise not to subject the individual to the death penalty was 
adequate, as it was within the power of the promisor. The second requirement is 
evidenced by Chahal v UK535 whereby it was felt by the ECtHR that while the promise by the 
Indian government that Chahal would be well treated was made in good faith, it lacked the 
power to ensure that the promise would be adhered to.536 Finally part three is 
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demonstrated by Agiza v Sweden537 whereby an Egyptian man was transferred to Egypt 
after having been convicted in absentia for terrorism offences. Despite promises by Egypt 
that he would not be mistreated, the Committee against Torture found against Sweden as 
it ought to have know that security-related and political prisoners are routinely mistreated 
in Egyptian prisons, and therefore the promisor did not ‘enjoy the required level of 
credibility in relation to the matter at hand and their assurance could not be relied 
upon.’538 Objectively assessed, diplomatic assurances therefore seem to be a legitimate 
method whereby sending states may seek to prevent ill-treatment in the receiving state. 
However, there are obvious issues with diplomatic assurances, and especially in the field of 
extraordinary renditions. First of all, in Satterthwaite’s words they seem to be a 
‘circumvention of the absolute prohibition against torture and refoulement to torture – the 
creation of “an island of legality, in a sea of illegality.”’539 A requirement of the Human 
Rights Committee and Committee Against Torture relating to diplomatic assurances is that 
they must be subject to judicial review.540 As extraordinary rendition seems to rely on 
secret transfers, the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of such transfers is necessarily 
diminished beyond semblance.541
Secondly, the assurances are almost always sought from a country whose human rights 
record is less than perfect and which therefore has no interest in adhering to the 
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agreement.542 There is also a more sinister scenario whereby assurances are a front, 
obtained purely to add a veneer of legality to an unlawful transfer. As Satterthwaite points 
out, ‘if renditions are being conducted with the intent of subjecting an individual to 
coercive interrogations, the incentive structure is classically and horribly perverse: the 
sending country has an investment in the receiving country’s abusive practices, and both 
states want those abuses to remain secret.’543 This would suggest that any monitoring 
mechanism which assurances may call for will not be adhered to or will be ineffective: it 
would be embarrassing to the sending state if mistreatment were discovered, many of the 
destination states for extraordinary renditions are adept at hiding their misdeeds, and 
detainees are often reluctant to reveal mistreatment.544
It would seem then that while diplomatic assurances are prima facie within the law, as the 
authors of ‘Torture by Proxy’ point out, their implementation in practice raises significant 
doubts about their reliability as a means of safeguarding against the danger or risk of 
torture to an individual.
Irregular transfer may also be said to breach the requirement that individuals have the 
right to challenge decisions which affect their civil rights. Article 6 ECHR provides that ‘In 
the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law...’545 The ECtHR requires an analysis of what is actually at stake for the 
applicant; further what is at risk for an applicant must be ‘acute’.546 It can be argued that 
the possibility of being transferred to a country where you face the threat of mistreatment, 
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and indefinite incarceration could be characterised as acute. The ICCPR contains a similar 
provision in Article 14.547 Article 14 is of particular importance in safeguarding other rights 
guaranteed by the Covenant and as such cannot be circumvented where this would impact 
on non-derogable rights: ‘[d]eviating from fundamental principles of fair trial ... is 
prohibited at all times.’ 548 Further, according to the Human Rights Committee, States Party 
to the Covenant must ensure that no individual is deprived of their right to claim justice. 
This position applies to all individuals regardless of nationality or statelessness who may 
find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State party.549 An all 
encompassing Article, it would appear to be breached where an individual is unable to 
challenge their deportation. More specifically, the Covenant also contains an article which 
refers specifically to the expulsion of aliens. Article 13 states that such an expulsion may 
only take place where the alien has previously been given the opportunity to challenge the 
grounds upon which his expulsion has been based. In Samira Karker v France, the 
Committee criticised the State Party on the grounds that the applicant had initially not 
been afforded the opportunity to challenge his expulsion.550 In Mansour Ahani v Canada, 
the Committee stated that Article 13 must be read with Article 7 where an expulsion would 
lead to a potential infringement of the non-refoulement principle.551 The Committee 
further stated that even where a State Party can raise compelling reasons of national 
security as to why an individual should be denied the opportunity to challenge his 
deportation, this does not obviate the protection of Article 13.552 A process such as 
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extraordinary rendition is absolutely dependent upon secrecy, and preventing detainees 
from gaining access to the courts to challenge their treatment is an obvious requirement. 
Based on the case law identified above, the involvement of European States in facilitating 
the secrecy could certainly lead international responsibility for a breach of Article 6 ECHR, 
or Articles 13 and 14 ICCPR.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies as a minimum to the war on 
terror, does not contain any specific reference to transfers of individuals. However, given 
the link between these transfers and their ultimate aim, it could be argued that the 
prohibition on cruel treatment and torture should protect individuals exposed to 
extraordinary rendition in much the same was as with ECHR Article 3 and ICCPR Article 7. 
Should an individual fall under the protection of the Geneva Convention III relative to the 
protection of Prisoners of War (that is to say that war on terror were considered an 
international armed conflict, and other requirements are fulfilled553), Article 48 prohibits 
transfer where the individual concerned is not fully informed that it is taking place, and also 
where he is not given the possibility of notifying next of kin.554 As previously discussed, it is 
highly unlikely that a terrorist captured in the course of the war on terror would qualify for 
protection under GC III. It is more probable that protection would be afforded under GC IV. 
If this is the case, Article 49 states that individual or mass forcible transfers to another 
country are forbidden.555 European States which assist in transfers of extraordinary 
rendition detainees are likely to fall foul of the restrictions placed on transfers found in the 
Geneva Conventions, regardless of whether the war on terror is a non-international or 
international armed conflict. In the case of Abu Omar, Italy facilitated his forced transfer 
without his knowledge of the destination contrary to both Article 48 of the Third 
Convention and Article 49 of the Fourth Convention. Similarly, Macedonia provided 
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assistance in transferring Khaled el-Masri without his knowledge, again indicating a likely 
breach of the aforementioned Articles.
Individuals have been forcibly moved across borders before. Perhaps the most famous of 
these cases involved Adolf Eichmann and his removal from Argentina to Israel. Of 
fundamental importance to previous cases was the ability to challenge the lawfulness of 
the transfer. As Sadat states, in extraordinary rendition, not only are there ‘no clear legal 
procedures used regarding the person’s seizure and detention, but there is generally little 
or no opportunity to challenge either the legality of the detention and rendition, or the 
substance of the charges against the detainee in a subsequent judicial proceeding.’556 This 
relates to the right to challenge the transfer after it has been effected. Of more use to the 
individuals in question is the right to challenge prior to transfer. Satterthwaite believes 
there is a nascent procedural right in international law to challenge the lawfulness of 
transfer.557 Such a procedure would allow individuals to access a neutral decision maker 
who would determine whether the individual in question was personally at risk of ill 
treatment post-transfer, thereby removing the right of the transferring state to determine 
of its own accord whether someone it was seeking to expel was at risk.558 This avenue has 
been explored by the ECtHR in the case of Shamayev v Georgia and Russia559 where 
individuals suspected of terrorist crimes were transferred from Georgia to Russia following 
an extradition request. The applicants were not afforded the opportunity to challenge this 
extradition, and as such the Court found that Georgia had violated ECHR articles 3 and 13 
(the right to an effective remedy). The Convention was violated the moment Georgian 
authorities prevented the applicants from seeking relief from transfer on the basis that 
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they feared torture if returned to Russia. This demonstrates that as soon as European 
states hand individuals over to the US, there is the potential for them to have breached 
their international obligations. 
Clearly there are a number of provisions in several international treaties which restrict the 
ability of European States to transfer suspected terrorists outside of their national 
boundaries. The Abu Omar and Khaled el-Masri cases are exemplary instances where 
European States have assisted the CIA contrary to the legal standards to which they are 
subject. The inherent risk of torture and the secrecy in which the transfers were carried out 
are indicative of a clear disregard for the rights which should have been afforded to the 
two men in question. Italy and Macedonia therefore are responsible for breaches of their 
international responsibilities. 
C. Torture
There are no direct accusations that European States are torturing detainees. However, 
there have been numerous allegations of European complicity in torture committed by 
other states holding detainees. Of particular note are those identified by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights.  They  include (but are not limited to) the provision of 
information to foreign intelligence agencies which leads to the apprehension or 
extraordinary rendition; participation in interrogation of individuals who have been 
tortured; and receipt of information known or thought likely to have been obtained from 
tortured detainees.560
However, accusations have been made that suggest that individuals were tortured in 
European States, only not by European agents (for example in Poland, Romania and 
Lithuania). Thus, the breaches will have taken place under the jurisdiction of States Parties 
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to the ECHR, as required by Article 1, rendering states liable. Similarly, the ICCPR requires 
that its protections are extended to all people within the territory of a State Party.561 To 
that extent, any instances of torture which take place within the boundaries of European 
States and which they have knowledge of, will create the necessary conditions for 
responsibility of the European State. 
In terms of determining international responsibility for European States where the ill-
treatment takes place overseas, it must first be determined whether or not human rights 
instruments such as the ECHR, ICCPR and the CAT apply. With regards to the ICCPR, the 
extensiveness of its protection has been said to extend to those under the jurisdiction of a 
State Party, regardless of whether they are within its territory or not.  Therefore, acts of 
agents overseas may be attributed to the state for the purposes of the ICCPR. The extent of 
the meaning of jurisdiction within Article 1 ECHR is more problematic. In the Banković case 
the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR stated that ‘the jurisdictional competence of a State is 
primarily territorial’ and that ‘Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this 
ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction...’562 This would suggest that 
European involvement in interrogations which took place outside of the jurisdiction of the 
EU would not be covered by the ECHR. However, in subsequent cases, the Court has 
undermined the rationale behind the Banković decision. In Issa v Turkey  the Court (while 
finding the application inadmissible on factual grounds) reasoned that where an individual 
is under the ‘effective control’ of a State Party to the ECHR, the Convention will apply even 
where abuses take place in a third party country with the court stating that 
‘[a]ccountability in such situations stems from the fact that art 1 of the Convention cannot 
be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on 
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the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.’563  Such 
reasoning was expanded upon in Öcalan v. Turkey564 where the Court found it had 
jurisdiction over the actions of Turkish agents acting in Kenya. If this line of reasoning is 
followed, European states will be responsible for actions which breach the convention but 
which happen outside of their territory. Finally, the CAT will apply wherever there torture 
which is carried out ‘...by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity...’ This would suggest that 
actions which take place outside of national borders, but which have their genesis within 
the boundaries of States Parties, may still be covered by these instruments. 
There are three separate facets which then must be considered: (1) providing information 
which leads to the detention of an individual; (2) providing information or questions to be 
utilised during interrogation and torture sessions, or being present during interrogations; 
and (3) does the receipt of information derived from torture immediately engender 
international responsibility for complicity in torture? These questions are particularly 
relevant vis-à-vis the accusations made against the UK regarding Binyam Mohammed and 
in the Gambia case, as well as allegations of German involvement in the cases of Khalid el-
Masri and Mohammed Zammar. They also bear on the cases of Poland, Romania and 
Lithuania and their participation in detention, as well as Macedonia’s involvement in the el-
Masri case.
The difficulty with the scenario in part (1) is that while the information may well lead 
directly to the capture of an terrorist suspect, there can be no guarantee that this 
information played any part in what happens subsequently. That is to say, States may argue 
that to the best of their knowledge, the information was merely provided in order to detain 
the individuals, and that there was never any reason to believe that it would eventually 
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lead to torture and other ill-treatment. However, there could be instances (particularly 
where the UK provided information about Binyam Mohammed knowing that it would be 
first used to detain him, and subsequently during his interrogations) where the information 
was provided knowing that individuals would be detained and subsequently tortured. Here, 
the CAT may be engaged. Question (2) may also fall under the purview of the CAT which 
requires only that any action which may constitute torture be carried out ‘...by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity...’565 While the provision of information may not amount to 
instigation, a case can certainly be made for consent or acquiescence; acquiescence being a 
comparatively low threshold. Providing information, or sending questions, knowing that 
such provisions are likely to lead to, and be used during, interrogations of extraordinary 
rendition detainees is indicative of a general nonchalance to the use of enhanced 
interrogation techniques in order to extract information. This would seemingly apply to the 
UK (for its involvement in Binyam Mohammed’s interrogation). 
However, the ECHR and ICCPR do not contain a similar reference to acquiescence or 
consent. There are two arguments which may be made in such a case. The first of these 
may be made out relying on the reading into Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR of the 
prohibition on refoulement, an interpretation which is not there on a literal reading of the 
texts. It could be argued that this prohibition is part of a wider obligation not to ‘not to 
engage in activity which exposes the person to that risk of torture’566 and to make Article 3 
ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR more complete. If this is indeed the basis for the inclusion of the 
non-refoulement principle within these two articles, a suggestion can be made for a 
widening of this principle: that is that States may not generally engage in actions which 
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expose an individual to a risk of torture. This could include providing information or 
questions. If this line of reasoning were to be followed, this would lead to a breach of the 
primary obligation on States not to torture.
An alternative approach would be to argue that those carrying out the torture were the 
agents of the European States which were sending questions. State responsibility may be 
engendered by attribution of actions of actual and de facto agents to the State. Article 6 of 
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (ASR) holds that the ‘conduct of an organ placed at 
the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State 
under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the 
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.’567 If agents of third 
party States were ‘placed at the disposal’ of European States in the sense that they could 
be directed to put questions to detainees, a case could be made that Article 6 is engaged, 
and there is therefore a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 7 of the ICCPR could be 
made out. With that being said, Article 6 applies in a limited and precise situation where 
the benefitting state receives the exclusive service of the organ of the sending state, and 
the organ must act under the receiving state’s exclusive direction.568 Another, similar, 
option is presented by Article 8 of the ASR. This will apply where a State is directing or 
controlling individuals who commit breaches of the State’s international obligations.569 In 
order for this to occur, there must be a ‘specific factual relationship between the person or 
entity engaging in the conduct and the State.’570 Again this would be a very difficult 
scenario to prove. As the commentary to the ASR make clear, conduct will only be 
attributed to the state where the directions were specific and in this instance would 
require that the State ordered detainees to be mistreated as part of sending questions to 
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be asked during interrogations: ‘In general a State, in giving lawful instructions to persons 
who are not its organs, does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in 
an internationally unlawful way.’571 However, if such an argument can be made, it 
represents a potential ground for demonstrating a breach of Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 
ICCPR.
It has been alleged that some European States have actively sent officials to be part of 
interrogations conducted overseas. Martin Scheinin, in his report on protecting human 
rights while countering terrorism, believes that ‘active or passive participation by States in 
the interrogation of persons held by another State constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act if the State knew or ought to have known that the person was facing a real risk of 
torture or other prohibited treatment...’572 The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
suggests that such behaviour ‘would also appear to be legally borderline, and most 
probably beyond what is legal.’573 This line of reasoning can certainly be based in the CAT 
where mere acquiescence in torture is sufficient to amount to a breach of a State’s 
obligations. Whether it could apply to the ICCPR or ECHR would remain to be seen based 
on the idea that States must not even expose individuals to the threat of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, as discussed above. CEPS argues however that there is a 
‘categorical misunderstanding’ by some states in arguing that they will not engage in 
interrogations where there is evidence that torture has occurred or may take place.574 The 
reasoning follows that complicity or ‘entanglement’ in extraordinary rendition is present as 
soon as a State engages with the process: ‘[i]ndeed the ‘simple’ fact of illegal rendition and 
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detention is already a violation of human rights and a breach of law severe enough to 
prohibit member states from taking any advantage of it.’575
A harder question to pin down is identified by scenario (3); that is whether receiving 
information derived from torture amounts to a breach of Article 1 CAT, Article 3 ECHR and 
Article 7 ICCPR. Where a State knowingly receives information which has been derived 
from enhanced interrogation techniques, or has an expectation that it will receive answers 
to specific questions it has sent to be asked, or where a state receives information over a 
long period of time without seeking to verify the genesis of the information, a case can be 
made for acquiescence in torture. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights states, such 
actions ‘create a market for the information produced by torture [and] encourages States 
which systematically torture to continue to do so’ and is thus ‘likely to be in breach of the 
UK's international law obligation not to render aid or assistance to other States which are 
in serious breach of their obligation not to torture.’576 The Centre For European Policy 
Studies uses the metaphor ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ stating that ‘if the source of the 
evidence (the tree) is tainted, then anything deriving from it (the fruit) bears the same 
flaw’.577 Philippe Sands, in providing information to the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
argues that this type of behaviour will be caught under Article 4(1) of the CAT.578 While this 
refers to individual liability, an analogy may be drawn through the reasoning employed: 
Sands suggests that where the holder of the information knows, or would have known but 
for wilful blindness, that the information was obtained by torture, he is complicit in direct 
or indirect encouragement of torture, or certainly failing to take preventative steps.579
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Extending this logic, it could be argued that states which know that information has been 
derived from torture have been complicit in the acts which led to it being ascertained. 
Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, sees actions such as these as 
implying a ‘recognition of lawfulness’ in the methods used to obtain information: he states 
that this represents a position which is ‘irreconcilable with the obligation erga omnes of 
States to cooperate in the eradication of torture’.580  Scheinin does however state in 
another publication that it is difficult, in abstracto, to delimit precisely where complicity 
begins, and that ultimately a case-by-case analysis would be needed.581 Borelli, on the 
other hand, notes that there is no legal prohibition on the receipt of information possibly 
derived from torture.582 She argues that calls for legal sanctions to apply to states which do 
make use of such information ‘seem to go far beyond the current state of the international 
law of state responsibility.’583
The difficult question in this area is should intelligence agencies be subject to an absolute
prohibition on the mere receipt of intelligence derived from torture? There is no suggestion 
that these states are intending to use the information in court proceedings, where it is 
acceptable that such a position applies. However, its use in security operations is certainly 
not so clear cut: as noted in the House of Lords by Lord Nicholls, 
Should [the security services] discard [information derived from torture] as 
'tainted', and decline to use it lest its use by them be regarded as condoning 
the horrific means by which the information was obtained? The intuitive 
response to these questions is that if use of such information might save lives 
it would be absurd to reject it... The government is using information obtained 
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by torture. But in cases such as these the government cannot be expected to 
close its eyes to this information at the price of endangering the lives of its 
own citizens. Moral repugnance to torture does not require this.584
On the one hand, States certainly should seek to ensure that torture as an institutionalised 
practice is eradicated throughout the world. On the other, they owe a duty to their citizens 
to ensure that they are not exposed to the threat of loss of life or serious injury. It is 
difficult therefore to know where the balance should be struck. Where States knowingly 
receive information derived from torture, or actively seek the assistance of States they 
know will employ harsh interrogation techniques, a clear argument for acquiescence in 
torture can be made. However, where a state passively receives information such a case is 
considerably harder to make out. Passive receipt of information, especially in ‘one-off’ 
cases, cannot be said to fall under the requirements of the aforementioned articles: there 
is and lack of knowledge on the part of the State where information is received passively, 
and therefore no State official could have acquiesced to the torture under which it was 
obtained.585 In these instances, as Lord Nicholls says it is arguably absurd to deny the State 
the right to make use of such information.
Customary international law represents another ground upon which to demonstrate 
international responsibility for torture. The prohibition on torture has attained the status of 
a peremptory norm of customary international law which cannot be derogated from at any 
time. One option would be to rely on Articles 40 and 41 of the ASR. Article 40 provides the 
following:
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a 
serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
general international law.
                                                            
584 A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, para. 67-69 
per Lord Nicholls
585 Above n560
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2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic 
failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation586
The Articles then make clear that States may not recognise as lawful, nor assist in 
maintaining, a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law.587 An argument 
may be made (though perhaps tenuous) that sending questions or receiving information 
derived from torture, represents tacit approval of the use of torture and therefore 
recognises the breach as lawful, or assists in maintaining the breach through a sense of 
moral encouragement. The Joint Committee on Human Rights in the UK has considered this 
type of argument and came to the conclusion that the UK government does not fully 
appreciate ‘these positive obligations in relation to torture, not to acquiesce in torture or 
to validate the results of it’ suggesting that it too sees Articles 40 and 41 as of genuine 
concern.588
International humanitarian law as encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions may also come 
into play, depending on the extent to which the war on terror may be considered an armed 
conflict. The minimum standard of treatment which applies to the war on terror and is set 
forth in Common Article 3, which requires that individuals be treated humanely and be 
protected from torture. Should individuals detained during the war on terror be classified 
as POWs for the purposes of Geneva Convention III (meaning that the war on terror is 
classified as an international armed conflict) Article 13 requires they be treated humanely, 
while Article 130 provides that to subject them to torture would amount to a grave breach 
of the Third Geneva Convention. Similarly, should they be classified as civilians for the 
purposes of Geneva Convention IV (again requiring that the war on terror is an 
international armed conflict), Article 27 demands they be treated humanely, while Article 
31 prohibits ‘physical or moral coercion ... in particular to obtain information from them or 
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587 Article 41 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility
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from third parties.’589 Torture is again specifically proscribed.590 There is also the alternative 
protection of Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Conventions which also 
proscribes torture. Once again, however, the question remains to what extent European 
States were primarily responsible for breaches which may arise from these areas.
However, similar difficulties arise due to the fact that European States have not themselves 
been engaging in torture. Therefore, with regards to IHL, the most likely avenue for 
European responsibility would be through complicity. However, Article 16 of the ASR which 
requires ‘aid or assistance’ on the part of the complicit state seems only to be effective 
where sending information which leads to capture is concerned: at a stretch this could 
amount to assistance. However, in the case of sending questions, or receiving information 
derived from torture, Article 16 is arguably irrelevant. Nevertheless, a more general 
conception of complicity, such as that presented by the UN Joint Study into Secret 
Detention, could be employed. This would require that a State could be complicit where it 
takes advantage of the situation of secret detention by sending questions to be asked or by 
providing information leading to secret detention.591 If it is possible to be complicit in 
secret detention in this way, there is no reason not to extend the application of this form of 
complicity to include torture and other forms of mistreatment. Besides its application to 
the Geneva Conventions, this argument could also be applied to international human rights 
instruments as another way to engender international responsibility.
Given the nature of the accusations made by victims of extraordinary rendition, it is highly 
likely that all of the legal instruments considered will be engaged, at a minimum for cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, and possibly for torture. The difficulty with regards to 
European States is determining in what way responsibility is likely to attach to their 
                                                            
589 Article 31, Geneva Convention IV
590 Article 32, Geneva Convention IV
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involvement in the process. There are a number of arguments which can be made in this 
area, including the idea of a general prohibition not to expose someone to the risk of 
torture, or through an analysis of a number of articles in the ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility, or further through a more general understanding of complicity. It is likely 
that some responsibility will affix to the actions of European States. 
D. Overflights
Extraordinary rendition relies on the use of European airspace and airports if individuals are 
to be transported to black sites for detention and interrogation. As this is the case, 
overflights in all their guises represent a potential avenue for a finding of primary state 
responsibility, as well as the most likely route to a finding of complicity in extraordinary 
rendition. A vast number of European states have been implicated in allowing US planes 
known to be active in the rendition programme to fly through their airspace or land at their 
airports for refuelling recuperation.592 As an absolutely necessary part of the extraordinary 
rendition process, overflights can be linked to all constituent aspects such as torture, illegal 
transfer and secret detention. 
`ingly allows an individual to pass through its territory en route to a secret detention site, 
or to face ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, this may engender the responsibility of the 
passive state. As discussed in the previous section on torture, allowing an overflight could 
be a breach of a general prohibition not to expose anyone to the risk of torture or 
mistreatment.593 The Venice Commission has taken this approach in its analysis of 
overflights and the application of the ECHR, stating that ‘[t]he requirement of not exposing 
any prisoner to the real risk of ill-treatment also applies in respect of the transit of 
prisoners through the territory of Council of Europe member States: member States should 
                                                            
592 See discussion in Chapter II
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therefore refuse to allow transit of prisoners in circumstances where there is such a risk.’594
The Commission goes on to conclude that it is not just the risk of torture that states are 
obliged to avoid; merely exposing someone to a breach of their Convention rights  also 
engages state responsibility.595 Further, states have an obligation to take necessary 
preventative measures, within their powers to protect all persons on board a rendition 
plane, for they are subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state.596 The UK Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has looked into the impact of the CAT on states which permit 
overflights. The Committee’s report highlights the positive obligations which the CAT places 
on states to investigate credible claims that their airspace may have been used as a means 
to transport individuals to face torture and other forms of ill-treatment.597 Failing to 
investigate such claims can lead to a breach of European State’s obligations under the CAT. 
Overflights may also fall under the purview of Article 1 of the Convention against Torture 
provided that state officials had knowledge of the reasons for such flights being made. If 
this were the case, an argument for acquiescence in torture could be made. Further, the 
Committee has argued that simply to allow an individual to be transported through the 
territory of a European State could lead to a breach of the non-refoulement principle, and 
hence responsibility for a breach of ECHR Article 3, CAT Article 3 and ICCPR Article 7.598
In terms of complicity, the use of sovereign airspace to transport individuals could be 
characterised as the provision of an essential facility for the purposes of Article 16 of the 
ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. Indeed, the Venice Commission explicitly states that 
to knowingly provide transit through sovereign airspace may amount to providing 
assistance as per the requirements of Article 16.599 Scheinin and Vermeulen likewise argue 
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that such permissive agreements on overflight clearance or provision of refuelling facilities 
constitute the vital assistance which Article 16 calls for, stating that these permissions 
‘trigger state responsibility, as it has been proven that these types of assistance were vital 
to exercise practises of extraordinary renditions and secret detentions which are by 
definition in breach of international law.’600 However, it must be questioned whether such 
an omission (that is, a failure to prevent a rendition plane travelling through sovereign 
airspace) can constitute ‘aid or assistance’. In the Genocide Convention Case the ICJ ruled 
out the possibility of complicity by omission because, on the facts, the genocide would 
have occurred regardless of Serbia’s action or inaction.601 Overflights are a different 
proposition, however; it may be that European States explicitly granted permission to use 
their airspace (in which case, on the preceding analysis, responsibility for complicity may 
arise) or they simply did not object as they have no reason to believe the flights were 
unlawful, and chose not to act (whereby their inaction has not altered the ultimate 
consequences and responsibility may not be incurred). This is a factual question which 
would only be determined should such a case make it before a judicial body.
Of course, each of these accusations will only be substantiated where the European states 
in question had knowledge of the situation. It is the opinion of the Temporary Committee 
on Indefinite Detention that it is an impossibility that the States in question possessed no 
knowledge whatsoever of the situation at hand.602 Indeed in working documents 7 and 8, 
the Temporary Committee believes the evidence it has collected irrefutably point to the 
conclusion that European states must have had some knowledge of the programme, and 
                                                            
600 Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘International Law – Human Rights Law and State 
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601 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
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the planes which were being used during it.603 The EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights has stated that in its opinion the amount of evidence which is available 
to European States, particularly regarding CIA front companies, could mean that EU states 
have the level of knowledge which would be sufficient to lead to a breach of their primary 
obligations.604 They present the situation whereby 
If an airplane with a registration number listed on the “black list” of aircraft, 
operated by a company known to be a front company for the CIA, with route 
Guantánamo Bay via, for example, Shannon, Ireland or Ramstein, Germany to 
Mitiga, Libya asks overflight clearance or landing permission for technical 
maintenance, then this should be enough suspicious information to justify a search 
of the aircraft.605
If this is indeed the case, it may be reasonably suggested that European States should bear 
some responsibility for allowing CIA rendition planes to fly through their airspace 
unimpeded. Knowingly permitting overflights does more than simply expose an individual 
to the risk of torture; it is a tacit agreement that such torture may take place, no questions 
asked. For this reason, States which explicitly granted permission for rendition flights to 
take place should be internationally responsible for their role in the process, and the 
breaches of numerous legal regimes that overflights entail. 
                                                            
603 Rapporteur: Giovanni Claudio Fava, Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European 
countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners ‘WORKING DOCUMENT No 7 
on ‘extraordinary renditions’’ <http://www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/working-doc-no-7-nov-
06.pdf>; and ‘WORKING DOCUMENT N° 8 on the companies linked to the CIA,  aircraft used by the 
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However, despite the preponderance of evidence to suggest that European States were 
aware of what was happening in their airspace, there is one main reason as to why the 
flights continued to take place. This problem presents itself in the way in which the planes 
presented themselves – as civil aircraft. The Convention on International Civil Aviation (the 
Chicago Convention) sets forth the rules governing airspace. Aircraft are either of State or 
Civil character. Of particular importance is the Convention’s provision that civil aircraft may 
fly through the airspace, or make a technical stop at an airport of another nation, without 
prior notification.606 State aircraft do not enjoy this privilege, as Article 3(c) of the Chicago 
Convention provides that state aircraft may not fly over sovereign territory without express 
authorisation from the state concerned.607
By using private civil jets, the US seemingly avoids the need to seek prior authorisation 
before entering sovereign airspace. However, the two types of aircraft are distinguished by 
examining the function of the flight. “Aircraft are recognised as state aircraft when they are 
under the control of the State and used exclusively by the State for state intended 
purposes”608 such as carrying out “military, customs and police services”.609 Also of import 
is Article 4 of the Chicago Convention which holds that “Each contracting State agrees not 
to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention”.610
Extraordinary rendition flights must be considered to be carrying out a state function. The 
question then is whether these aircraft are abusing civil aviation. The Venice Commission 
makes specific reference to this point and concludes that
...state aircraft can only claim immunity inasmuch as they make their state 
function known to the territorial State through the appropriate channels. If the 
public purpose was not declared in order to circumvent the requirement of 
                                                            
606 Article 5 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) 
607 Article 3(c) Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) Article 3(c)
608 Above n471, para 91  
609 Article 3(b) Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) Article 3(b)
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obtaining the necessary permission(s), then the State will be estopped from 
claiming State aircraft status and the airplane will be deemed to be civil and 
thus falling within the scope of application of the Chicago Convention, 
including its Article 16 providing for the territorial State’s right to search and 
inspection.611
Therefore, if a European nation has any reason to suspect that an aircraft claiming civil 
flight clearance is committing a human rights abuse, it may order the flight to land so that it 
may be visited and searched. If the captain of the flight claims that the plane is a state 
aircraft and therefore immune from inspections this will be an abuse of civil aviation.
It seems apparent that overflights represent a clear basis for a finding of responsibility for a 
breach of European States’ obligations under international law. The fact that they 
represent an absolute necessity with regards to transporting detainees suggests that 
overflights may be linked to every aspect of the extraordinary rendition programme. 
Further, given the likelihood that European States were aware of the nature of rendition 
flights, this would suggest that they possessed the requisite knowledge for a number of 
potential avenues to responsibility, including acquiescence under the CAT and complicity 
under Article 16 of the ASR. There remain, however, difficulties in seeing how European 
States could prevent such flights taking place, as presented by the Chicago Convention and 
the designation of such planes as civil aircraft. Should those difficulties be overcome, it can 
be strongly suggested that overflights could lead to international responsibility for 
European States.
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V
Concluding Remarks
There is a vast amount of evidence which suggests that European States were at least 
aware of extraordinary rendition operations taking place within their territory, and perhaps 
even actively participating in the procedure. This paper has highlighted four main areas in 
an archetypal extraordinary rendition: secret detention, unlawful transfer, the practice of 
overflights and torture. It can be argued that European States have been involved to some 
extent in each of these areas. Poland, Romania and Lithuania have allegedly provided the 
CIA with secret detention facilities. Italy and Macedonia reportedly assisted in the unlawful 
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transfer of Abu Omar and Khaled el-Masri respectively. Almost all EU countries have to 
some extent allowed planes known to be linked to the extraordinary rendition process to 
fly through their airspace unimpeded. And finally, there are several reports that countries 
such as the UK and Germany have benefited from the torture of individuals suspected to 
have undergone extraordinary rendition. 
Each one of these aspects is in some way prohibited in international law. There is a high 
degree of correlation between the ECHR, ICCPR, CAT and Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
These instruments demonstrate that the prohibition on the infliction of torture, cruel or 
inhuman treatment or punishment, and the prohibition on refoulement are absolutely 
guaranteed in international law. Further, the right to freedom of person is expressed in 
several treaties and while not absolute, the limited grounds upon which an individual may 
be detained cannot be said to include a process which is arbitrary and results in secret, 
incommunicado detention. Overflights present a more difficult problem, though their 
unlawfulness can be demonstrated by analysis of States’ responsibilities to investigate 
reports of abuse, as well as acquiescence in torture. It is possible that many European 
States will be responsible for a direct breach of their legal responsibilities, especially in the 
case of the CAT and also where refoulement is involved. However, this is not necessarily 
the only way by which these States will be responsible. Complicity, either as a general legal 
construct, or through assistance provided in accordance with Article 16 of the International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, represents an alternative route to 
responsibility as the secondary actor in a breach.
That States have been flouting their international obligations in such an egregious manner 
is worrying. The law in this area cannot be called deficient, as there are myriad 
international treaties dealing with the issues which are raised. The problem then is that 
States are simply ignoring their responsibilities, seeing them as an obstacle to protecting 
133
their territory as they would like. This begs the question of whether States should be 
permitted to utilise processes such as extraordinary rendition where national security is at 
risk. Security services have suggested that they should be allowed to utilise information 
which is derived from torture, especially where they were not responsible for the actual 
treatment in question. Italy and the UK have argued before the ECtHR that the expulsion of 
a suspected terrorist should be possible even where it would breach the principle of non-
refoulement.612 Several States have seemingly sought to circumvent the right to security of 
person in the case of alleged terrorist offences. Such assertions rely on the notion that 
terrorism in the 21st century represents a unique and previously unseen threat to the 
stability of nation states. 
This argument is demonstrably flawed. The law does not prevent governments around the 
world from effectively dealing with terrorism; on the contrary, it offers a framework that 
protects citizens, while respecting the rights of the accused.613 It may be unpalatable to 
some that suspected terrorists, who are willing to cause immense suffering and fear to 
further their aims, deserve human rights protections. Yet States cannot be allowed to fall to 
this level, to do so would be to propagate the very ills they seek to prevent. It will take a 
strong reiteration of the international legal regime, with major powers leading from the 
front to prove that human rights remain respected, even when fighting those who would 
flout them.
Given the extent to which the current international legal regime covers the issue, 
extraordinary rendition does not necessarily require a new, specific treaty to be 
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introduced. However the international community has shown that it is willing to act and 
create a new legal document if deemed necessary, for example in the case of enforced 
disappearances. Enforced disappearances bear many similarities with extraordinary 
rendition: victims are often tortured and the practice violates the right of security of 
person. Initially, instances of this practice were analysed in light of the various treaties such 
actions breached, but in December 2006, the UN adopted the text for the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.614 This 
Convention is considered to be very robust, with a number of novel provisions which 
effectively tackles the phenomenon of enforced disappearances specifically.615 While not 
essential, were something similar to be introduced for extraordinary rendition, it could be 
useful in preventing such abuses becoming a permanent tool in the fight against terrorism.
What must also be remembered is that States volunteered to adhere to the principles set 
down in international human rights and humanitarian law instruments. No nation was 
forced to sign any of the treaties which they now claim to be an unnecessary encumbrance 
on their security services. For this reason it is difficult to be sympathetic to the States’ 
arguments that they should be released from their obligations. It must be the States who 
lead the way in righting the wrongs of extraordinary rendition. Yet as long as they continue 
to cloak themselves in state secrets and national security, there are unlikely to be any 
positive steps taken. It is for this reason that the work of supranational organisations such 
as the Council of Europe and campaign groups such as Amnesty is so important: one 
traditional tool to encourage change is embarrassment.616 By highlighting the involvement 
of States in such highly questionable activities, governments may experience a groundswell 
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of opinion against them. Indeed, states have already begun the process of looking into their 
potential role in human rights abuses. In Italy several high ranking CIA officers had arrest 
warrants issued against them, and they along with some members of SISMI (the Italian 
security service) were convicted following their involvement in the Abu Omar affair.617 In 
the UK a judge led investigation is (at the time of writing) about to begin to look into the 
role of the UK security services in questioning terror suspects.618 Individuals who have 
allegedly undergone ER should be given the opportunity to present their case before 
national or international tribunals in order to determine the facts and reach a sensible 
conclusion to their ordeals. Governments should not be able to hide behind the doctrine of 
state secrets where this may prevent individuals from securing the recompense they 
deserve. To do so is to insult them a second time. With States appearing to take these 
necessary steps, there may come a time where the areas identified here eventually lead to 
international responsibility for the guilty parties. 
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